

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

OCTOBER 15-28, 1962

This chronology has been prepared on the basis of information provided by the White House Press Office, the Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, and the State Department Bureau of Public Affairs.

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Chronology of the Cuban Crisis, October 15-28, 1962

October 15
Monday

Aerial photographs taken previous day are developed and analyzed. They indicate existence of strategic missiles and sites in Cuba. Between 8 and 10 p.m. this information is relayed to Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, General Carter, General Carroll, General Taylor, Secretary of State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director McCone and his Deputy, Ray Cline, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin. Secretary Rusk takes call in pantry outside State Dining Room at State Department, where he is hosting dinner for German Foreign Minister Schroeder. Mr. Martin receives message at National Press Club, just after he finishes talk to Sigma Delta Chi on Cuba situation.

October 16
Tuesday

At 9 a. m. the President in his bedroom receives photographic evidence from Mr. McGeorge Bundy. At 11:45 President convenes meeting at the White House. Those attending: Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, General Maxwell Taylor, Messrs. Roswell Gilpatric, George Ball, Edwin Martin, McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorenson, Douglas Dillon, Charles Bohlen and Kenneth O'Donnell. It is decided that reconnaissance of Cuba should be greatly increased.

Conferences that afternoon at the State Department included Messrs. Rusk, Ball, Martin, Alexis Johnson, Ambassador Bohlen, Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Stevenson. At 6:30 p. m. there is another

meeting at the White House, with the same people as the morning meeting.

Meetings resume at the State Department that evening, winding up in the Secretary's office after 11 p. m. It is decided to maintain very tight security.

That afternoon and thereafter every morning at 8:30 the U. S. Intelligence Board meets. Representatives from State Department, CIA, and military. In Moscow, Ambassador ^{KOHLER} ~~Bolton~~ sees Mr. Khrushchev.

October 17
Wednesday

A "blur of meetings" of the main policy group in Under Secretary Ball's Conference Room. All the people at Tuesday's White House meetings except the President and Vice President, with the addition of Mr. Dean Acheson, Mr. John McCone, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. Meeting evaluates the evidence, what it means, and possible responses.

Reconnaissance flights ordered Tuesday take place. Read-out on aerial photographs indicates launching pads and signs of mobile launchers with missiles.

President sees Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. John McCone at 9:35 a. m. Flies to Connecticut to campaign in afternoon. Is met at airport that night by Mr. Robert Kennedy and Mr. Ted Sorenson.

Was a day of "full and free discussion", no rigid positions, no "departmental" points of view.

October 18
Thursday

Meeting with President at White House at 11 a.m. At 3:30 p. m. the President met with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. In between,

group assembles in Secretary of State's conference room, starting at 2:30. That meeting continues into evening. At 4:30 the President met Mr. Rusk and Ambassador Thompson alone. They met with Mr. Gromyko at 5 to 7:08 p. m. Dinner for Mr. Gromyko at State Department starts at 8:00 p.m., lasts until 12:25 a. m. Meanwhile, meeting continues in Mr. Ball's conference room. Secretary McNamara, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, and Mr. John McCone, seen arriving at State Department, are asked by a reporter "Are you going to the dinner?" Reply: "Yes." At 9 p. m. the President called the group, except Ambassador Bohlen, replaced by Ambassador Thompson, to White House. To avoid attracting attention to their limousines, nine of the group rode to White House in one car. At this meeting final consensus began to develop. At 12:25 a. m. Mr. Rusk, Mr. Ball, Mr. Johnson, Ambassador Thompson, Mr. Martin confer in Secretary's conference room. Mr. Robert Lovett brought in that afternoon. During day reconnaissance of Cuba continues. Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (General Taylor) to: 1) have a list prepared of riot control equipment and other support which the U. S. could give Latin American nations for internal security purposes; 2) determine which Latin American nations could assist the U. S. in a blockade of Cuba; 3) to prepare a list of offensive weapons to include in a blockade; 4) to consider pro's and con's of blockading aircraft as well as ships.

October 19
Friday

Meetings of interdepartmental group all day from 11 a. m. at State Department, mainly in Under Secretary's conference room. As outlines of possible courses of action emerge, working groups are established within the policy group. Before President left on trip met JCS, Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara. Departure delayed one-half hour. President away on campaign trip. That night Secretary Rusk cancels speech to Business Council in Hot Springs, Va. Our ambassadors to Latin American countries who are in the U. S. are ordered to return to their posts. Aerial reconnaissance continues.

Cancellation of TAC's full mobility exercise is announced by Pentagon, attributed to weather in refueling areas caused by Hurricane Ella.

During night first draft of President's October 22 speech put together.

Following statement used in response to query: "A Pentagon spokesman denied tonight that any alert has been ordered or that any emergency measures have been set in motion against Communist ruled Cuba.

Further, the spokesman said the Pentagon has no information indicating the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba."

October 20
Saturday

9:00 a. m. meeting at State Department in Mr. Ball's conference room.

During morning several Assistant Secretaries of State brought in (Messrs. Tyler, Talbot, Harriman) and Legal Adviser Chayes to draft messages, letters, contingency papers.

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At 8:12 a. m., the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised commanders-in-chief that state of tension in Cuba could lead to military action. USIA prepares to link up American medium wave stations with Voice of America to broadcast President's speech, and to go on 24 hours a day transmission in Spanish. President returns from campaign trip with "cold."

At 2:30 p. m. meeting of planning group of principals of National Security Council, Oval Room. The full group, including Ambassadors Stevenson, Thompson, Robert Lovett. Detailed intelligence briefing given, aerial photographs exhibited. Enlarged photographs shown to President on the stage of work at each missile site. President decides to institute the quarantine as quickly as possible taking into account need to notify allies and to permit military preparations.

President's television address set for Monday at 7:00 p. m. P Hour. Draft of speech discussed and revised. Plans for OAS, United Nations, also presented. Possibility remained of acting sooner if a security breach developed. That night State Department sends "pre-position" messages to all Latin American posts, subject to

"go" signal Monday, indicating course of action to be followed.

Defense Department prepares for quarantine.

October 21
Sunday

Staffs summoned during day to Defense, State Departments. Work at State involves Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, regional and functional bureaus. Tight security successfully maintained. Drafting of Quarantine Proclamation completed.

Mr. Dean Acheson briefed for mission to Europe. Mr. Livingston Merchant called in to prepare for mission to Ottawa. Ambassador Dowling called back from Georgia. Resolutions prepared for OAS, UN. Mr. Robert Manning (State), Mr. Arthur Sylvester (Defense), Mr. Pierre Salinger (White House) meet to establish public affairs coordination.

President meets with National Security Council, and with Mr. Don Wilson (USIA), Admiral Anderson (CNO) at 2:30 p. m. Discussion centers on third draft of speech and progress reports on preparations. It was decided that our first objective would be to block further shipments of offensive military equipment to Cuba, and that our aim was also to see that the Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba under UN supervision and inspection. Mr. O'Brien

worked up a list of Congressional leaders to be summoned to Washington. Mr. Salinger, Mr. O'Brien, and General McHugh worked out airfields at which jets could pick up Congressmen concerned in the morning.

During the day Mr. Larry O'Brien summons congressional leaders to White House meeting Monday at 5 p.m. Sunday night State Department sends top secret telegrams in code describing proposed actions to our Ambassadors. Text of President's speech with covering letter to Mr. Khrushchev sent to Embassy in Moscow for delivery to Soviet Foreign Office one hour before President's speech. President's letters to Prime Minister MacMillan, President de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Ministers Nehru, Diefenbaker, and Fanfani, Mayor Brandt and others sent in code to our Embassies for transmission. Text of President's speech sent in code to all posts. Individual letters from President sent to 43 Heads of Government. During weekend the State Department transmitted 15 separate Presidential letters or other documents to a total of 441 recipients.

That afternoon and evening the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) to prepare to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo on Monday, to reinforce that base starting Monday, to assume

operational control of certain Army and Air Force units, and to be prepared to furnish riot support control to Latin American countries as required. At 10 p.m. Secretary McNamara approved the procedures and rules of the quarantine.

October 22
Monday

Mr. Larry O'Brien started summoning Congressional leaders. Policy group meets with President at 11:00 a.m. National Security Council meets at 3:00. President formally establishes Executive Committee of National Security Council and asks it to meet with him daily at 10:00 a.m. At noon, Mr. Pierre Salinger requests air time from radio and television networks, which is granted, and announces President will make important statement at 7:00 p.m. Also, at noon, dependents start being evacuated from Guantanamo. That morning a planning directive for the quarantine of Cuba was issued to the Atlantic Fleet. Nine radio stations are asked to broadcast President's speech to Latin America in Spanish. 4:00 p.m. Cabinet meeting. 5:00 p.m. Briefing for Congressional leaders at White House. 6:15 NATO, SEATO, CENTO Ambassadors' given background briefing at State Department. At 6:00 p.m. Ambassador Dobrynin sees Secretary Rusk. During day Prime Minister MacMillan briefed by Ambassador Bruce, President de Gaulle by Mr. Dean Acheson, and Chancellor Adenauer by Ambassador Dowling.

Mr. Acheson also briefs NATO Council. At 7:00 p.m.

President speaks. At 7:30 letter from Ambassador Stevenson with draft of U.S. resolution given to Mr. Zorin in his capacity as President of the Security Council. At 7:30 p.m., Assistant Secretary Martin briefs OAS Ambassadors. At 8:15 p.m.

Secretary Rusk briefs all other Ambassadors, and State Department background briefing for the press is held. Secretary McNamara briefs press at Pentagon, also on background basis.

Aerial photographs exhibited and explained at all briefings.

Public Affairs offices at State, Defense, White House go on 24-hour basis. Pentagon reviews mobilization planning.

Preparations are ordered for possible reserve recall. Secretary McNamara directs step up in induction and training of Cuban nationals. From 10:40 to 11:25 p.m. he visits office of Chief of Naval Operations for discussions of the blockade and establishment of surveillance.

October 23
Tuesday

Executive Committee meets twice, 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.

President approves issuance of Proclamation of Interdiction.

President signs Executive Order authorizing extension of tours of duty for certain members of armed forces. Three subcommittees of Executive Committee established: on Berlin problems, advance planning, and communications. At 7:00 p.m. President signs

Proclamation at White House. At 8:00 p.m. Secretary of Defense announces that action has been taken to deploy our forces to make effective the quarantine by 10:00 a.m. the next morning. Also announces extension of active duty of certain personnel in Navy and Marine Corps. CINCLANT instructed to implement maritime quarantine. Chief of Naval Operations put in charge. At 9:00 a.m. Secretary Rusk speaks to OAS Organ of Consultation in Washington. At 3:00 p.m. the OAS reconvenes and at 4:45 by 19-0 vote, it adopts Resolution backing quarantine and urging immediate removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

At 4:00 p.m. Ambassador Stevenson delivers opening statements to Security Council, and exhibits aerial photographs. Cuban and Soviet UN Representatives also speak. Messages from President sent by State Department to Mayor Brandt, Chancellor Adenauer, President de Gaulle.

October 24
Wednesday

Quarantine takes effect. Executive Committee meets at 10 a.m. at White House. At 11:00 a.m. State Department background briefing is held for delegates of European Broadcasting Union. OAS meets at 3:00 p.m. At 3 p.m., the French, British, and German ambassadors see Secretary Rusk. There is a Congressional Briefing at 5:00 p.m. at the White House. At 1:00 a.m. 14 aerial reconnaissance photos (prematurely released by

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American Embassy, London) are made available to U.S. press. At 7:35 p.m. four low level aerial rec photos released. TASS releases exchange of telegrams between Mr. Bertrand Russel and Mr. Khrushchev. White House requests public media to exercise discretion in publishing information relating to national security. Defense issues announcement centralizing information release in Office of Public Affairs. At 4:00 p.m. Defense announces there are 8-10 bases near various Cuban cities, each base having 40 launchers; and that there are over 30 missiles, over 20 IL-28 jet fighter bombers, and over 5,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba. The Greek oiler "Sirius" is cleared through the quarantine. At 9:00 a.m. the Security Council meets, with statements by Venezuela, the United Kingdom, Roumania, and Ireland. At 2:00 p.m. Mr. U Thant sends identical messages to President and Mr. Khrushchev asking that US and Soviet ships avoid direct confrontation for the next few days. At the 6:00 p.m. Security Council meeting there are statements by France, China, Chile, UAR, Ghana, and the Secretary General. UAR and Ghana submit resolution calling on both sides to refrain from action and to negotiate.

October 25
Thursday

Executive Committee of National Security Council meets at 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. The President given report on military situation and issues instructions for the interdiction and inspection of non-Bloc ships. President's reply to U Thant's message (10/24)

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sent at 2:19 p.m., stating Ambassador Stevenson will talk to U Thant. Mr. Khrushchev also replies to Mr. U Thant.

At 2:26 p.m. Mr. U Thant sends second message to President and Mr. Khrushchev asking avoidance of direct confrontations of Soviet and American ships in quarantine. Resolution adopted by the OAS on 10/23 transmitted to the UN. At Security Council meeting, Ambassador Stevenson challenges Mr. Zorin to deny existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. State Department gives background briefing for U.S. press, followed by 2:00 p.m. briefing for foreign press. State Department conducts briefings for Congressmen in Atlanta, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco.

At 11:50 a.m., Defense Department announces at least a dozen Soviet vessels have turned back, and that at 8:00 a.m. the Navy had intercepted the Soviet tanker BUCHAREST proceeding towards Cuba and permitted it to proceed without boarding.

At 8:35 p.m. the East German passenger ship VOIDERFRUEND with 20 students bound for Havana was cleared through the quarantine, as was the British ship SUIACO, bound for Jamaica. Late that night instructions are sent to all posts on "CLEARCERT" procedures to be followed by vessels departing from foreign ports destined for quarantine areas.

October 26
Friday

10:00 a.m. Excomm meeting at White House. Secretary of Defense reports on quarantine and Secretary Rusk reports on negotiations underway between Mr. U Thant and Ambassador Stevenson. The President authorizes release of statement noting that missile development work is continuing in Cuba and recalling his earlier statement that such work must cease. At 4:00 p.m. British, German, and French Ambassadors are briefed at State Department and see Secretary. At 7:50 a.m. The Lebanese flag ship MARUCLA under charter to the Soviet Union is intercepted and boarded by a party from the JOSEPH P. KENNEDY and PIERCE. Boarding party not armed and ship permitted to proceed when no weapons are found. Later the Swedish ship COLLANGATTA passed through quarantine. At 6:15 Mr. Salinger announced that photo reconnaissance reveals continued buildup of missiles in Cuba. At 6:00 p.m. letter from Mr. Khrushchev to President received at State Department. In letter to Mr. U Thant Mr. Khrushchev accepts proposal that Soviet ships should stay out of interception area. President replies to Mr. U Thant that incidents can be avoided if Soviet ships stay out of interception area. Mr. U Thant sends letter to Premier Castro asking that work on missile bases be suspended while negotiations under way. Secretary of State and aides remain late at State Department analyzing the

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messages and other signals. That day tightened security measures go into effect at Pentagon. At 11:00 p.m. still unpublished letter received.

October 27
Saturday

President meets with Executive Committee of National Security at 10:00 a.m. in the Situation Room at the White House. During that meeting Mr. Khrushchev letter to President received as published in TASS and broadcast on Radio Moscow, stating that Jupiter missiles should be withdrawn from Turkey in exchange for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Between 10:15 and 11:00 a.m. a U-2 reconnaissance plane is shot down over Eastern Cuba. At about the same hour a U-2 accidentally overflies the Chokut Peninsula in Eastern USSR due to navigational difficulties. At Excomm President decides to issue public statement in response to unacceptable Mr. Khrushchev message of that morning, and to reply to Khrushchev letter of previous evening. White House press release at 4:35 p.m. refers to "inconsistent and conflicting" proposals of the USSR and calls attention to imperative necessity of dealing immediately with the Soviet missile threat in Cuba, "under which no sensible negotiation can proceed." At 3:15 p.m. the State Department announced the CLEARCERT system to assist vessels intending to transit waters near Cuba.

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At 3:35 p.m. the Pentagon announces that Jupiter missiles were made available to Turkey pursuant to a NATO Council Resolution of December, 1957. Also announced that our reconnaissance plane on flight over Cuba is missing and presumed lost. At 4:00 p.m. the Excomm meets again with President. Secretary McNamara reports that two low-level reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba have been fired on by light anti-aircraft and small arms. President approves reply to Mr. Khrushchev's private letter of the previous evening. It is transmitted at 8:05 p.m. and released to the press.

At 4:00 p.m. the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCLANT that the circular areas of 500 nautical miles radius centered on Havana and Cape Maysi had been designated as the "interception area" for the quarantine of Cuba. At 9:00 p.m. a note is received from the Secretary General that Soviet Representative Zorin refuses to receive information about the "interception area." At 9:00 Excomm Meeting President approves call-up of 24 troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve, which is announced by Secretary McNamara at 9:20 p.m.

At 9:19 p.m. State Department receives copy of Premier Castro's reply to Mr. U Thant flatly rejecting the proposal that missile bases be dismantled and demanding immediate halt of the naval blockade. Excomm discusses additional steps to be taken

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following day, such as mobilizing U.S. merchant ships and adding petroleum, oil, and lubricants to the prohibited list. That night at 12:12 a.m. instructions are sent to Ambassador Finletter for a special meeting of the NATO Council, to report on actions taken thus far and to review with NATO the problems arising out of Mr. Khrushchev's public letter. Letters from President are sent to President de Gaulle, and Chancellor Adenauer.

October 28
Sunday

Defense Department announces names of units of Air Force Reserve called up and that aerial reconnaissance of Cuba continuing. About 10:00 a.m. new Khrushchev message is broadcast over Radio Moscow. (Delivered to American Embassy, Moscow at 7:00 p.m. local time, ten minutes after start of broadcast). Full text as broadcast available at 11:00 a.m. meeting of Executive Committee. Message orders dismantling and returning of missiles to USSR under UN supervision. A reply to Mr. Khrushchev is discussed, approved, sent, and released, without waiting for official text to be received. The President in Excomm and a State Department official at 1:00 p.m. background press briefing indicate that while we welcome Mr. Khrushchev's message, it remains to be implemented, and many serious problems will be encountered in the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. This is not a

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time for gloating, nor can one reach any general conclusions about the future course of Soviet conduct in other areas. At 1:30 p.m. the Joint Chiefs direct CINCLANT to take no forceful action and not to board any ships until further orders.

At 5:00 p.m. Secretary of State briefs Latin American Ambassadors on latest developments. At 5:40 p.m.

Mr. U Thant writes President Kennedy stating his understanding of the agreement that has been reached in the exchange of correspondence. At 6:30 p.m. President sends letter to Mr. U Thant confirming the lines on which a satisfactory settlement of the Cuban situation can be reached. Mr. U Thant writes Premier Castro accepting invitation to go to Cuba with aides to work out solution.

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CUBAN CRISIS

15 October - 16 November 1962

This chronology tries to relate the significant events of the Cuban Crisis with the significant public affairs actions carried out by the Department of Defense. No attempt was made to list all press queries, only those of significance.

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EVENTS

October 15, 1962 Monday

Between 8 and 10 p. m. information regarding aerial photos taken 14 October is relayed to Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary State Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Secretary Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, CIA Director McCone, Deputy CIA Director Cline, Assistant Secretary State Martin.

October 16, 1962 Tuesday

9:00 a. m. President receives photographic evidence from Mr. McGeorge Bundy.

11:45 a. m. Meeting at White House: President, Vice-President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, General Taylor, Messrs. Gilpatric, Ball, Martin, McGeorge Bundy, Sorenson, Dillon, Bahlen, O'Donnell. Decision made to greatly increase reconnaissance of Cuba.

October 17, 1962 Wednesday

Aerial reconnaissance shows indications of 28 launching pads and other significant indication of mobile launches with missiles. President flies to Connecticut in afternoon.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 15, 1962 through October 17, 1962.

No announcements made and no queries answered regarding Cuba.

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EVENTS

October 18, 1962 Thursday

Aerial reconnaissance continues. JCS directs CINCONAD to increase air defense posture and CINCPAC to transfer operational control of reinforced infantry battalion from 5th MEB to CINCLANT. Many meetings during the day. CINCONAD commences movement of forces to augment air defense of Southeast United States.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 18, 1962 Thursday

Q. Regarding the POST story today about planes going to Florida, what do we have in Florida bases now and what has been sent in recently or planned to be sent in? Have planes been moved into McDill and Homestead AFB's?

A. Last March USAF announced it would activate an F-105 wing at George AFB and would move an F-100 wing from George to Homestead AFB to make room.

The Air Force also announced last January it would buy some McDonnell F4H fighters. In March it announced it would set up two wings in Florida at McDill AFB and have the people in place and ready to receive the new aircraft. At present there are two wings at McDill, both with F-84F aircraft.

ADC has a small number of aircraft at Homestead AFB.

SAC has B-52 and B-47 type bombers in Florida.

The Air Force has placed no aircraft in Florida in recent months (since March anyway) and has no announced plans to "beef up" against MIG's in Cuba.

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EVENTS

October 19, 1962 Friday

Aerial ~~reconnaissance~~ reconnaissance continues. TAC's fall mobility exercise
~~cancelled~~ CARIB and LANT alerted against possible air attack.
~~Hawk Battalion~~ at Fort Meade directed to move to Key West.
~~Hawk Battalion~~ transferred from PACOM to LANTCOM,
~~destination~~ Guantanamo.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 19, 1962 Friday

Q. Marines arrived in Key West today on LST. Why were they sent there?

A. Support personnel and equipment for aviation units engaged in the Carribbean exercise.

In answer to query regarding story in Northern Virginia Sun:

"A Pentagon spokesman denied tonight that any alert has been ordered or that any emergency military measures have been set in motion against Communist-ruled Cuba. Further, the spokesman said the Pentagon has no information indicating the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba."

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EVENTS

October 20, 1962 Saturday

JCS advised CINC's at 8:12 a.m. that state of tension with Cuba could lead to military action. JCS directed CINCLANT to suspend PHIBRIGLEX-62 at 11:07 a.m. Newsmen to go south as planned.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 20, 1962 Saturday

Q. Report that carrier ENTERPRISE with 80 planes aboard had pulled out of Hampton Roads, Virginia, on its way to Guantanamo, Cuba.

A. The ENTERPRISE loaded more than 80 planes yesterday for sailing to meet any hurricane eventuality and to conduct certain engineering tests at sea. Such sailing before a storm is standard Navy practices.

Q. Report that a battalion of Marines had landed at Boca Chica.

A. Part of routine Caribbean exercise called PHILBRIGLEX-62.

Q. UPI San Diego asks why Marines are being loaded on planes at El Toro. AP has reports of movement of Marines yesterday from Pendleton to El Toro.

A. They are taking part in the final phase of PHIBRIGLEX-62, an Atlantic Fleet exercise in the Caribbean which began October 15 and is scheduled to end in coming week with an amphibious sequence.

Q. What about ship, air and marine movements in Florida and Caribbean area?

A. So far as we know, all ship, air and marine movements in that area are connected with PHIBRIGLEX-62.

Q. Is there any alert at McDill AFB in addition to that for participation or use of activity by forces participating in PHIBRIGLEX-62?

A. Not that we know of.

Q. Why are 34 truckloads of soldiers camped near highway near Marathon, 50 miles from Key West, Florida?

QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 20, 1962 Saturday (Cont'd)

A. We know of no encampment of Army troops there and would assume they are forces headed for participation in PHIBRIGLEX -62.

Q. Why the roundup of naval personnel at Jacksonville today?

A. Routine local exercise was carried out at Jacksonville today by the Navy and it ended at noon.

Q. Report that 476th TFS at George AFB, California had sent eight or nine planes of support equipment and personnel to Cuba early this week.

A. No information on this.

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EVENTS

October 21, 1962 Sunday

~~Aerial reconnaissance~~ definitively indicated buildup of offensive
~~weapons in~~ Cuba. JCS directed CINCLANT to be prepared to
~~evacuate dependents from~~ Gtmo. JCS directed CINCLANT to
~~reinforce Gtmo~~ no earlier than P-day with ready CARIB PHIBRON
Marine ~~BLT~~. JCS directed CINCLANT to assume operational
~~control of Army and Air Force forces assigned for contingency~~
DPLANS.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 21, 1962 Sunday

Q. Report from Langley that KB-50 tanker planes have taken off and unable to find out their mission.

A. Some KB-50's have taken off as reported but it is a part of a normal mobility training activity.

Q. Where will PHIBRIGLEX-62 landing be?

A. Island of Vieques, 30 miles east of Puerto Rico.

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EVENTS

October 22, 1962 Monday

Planning directive for quarantine of Cuba was issued to the Atlantic Fleet during the morning.

Evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo started at Noon.

12:37 p. m. Authorized TAC to implement 1/8 airborne alert and execute force dispersal plan.

2:05 p. m. Directed CINCPAC to load 5th MEB and to change operational control to CINCLANT.

3:00 p. m. National Security Council Meeting.

4:00 p. m. Cabinet Meeting.

5:00 p. m. Briefing for congressional leaders at the White House.

7:00 p. m. President's Speech.

7:00 p. m. Set increased readiness status worldwide.

Late p. m. First dependents from Gtmo arrived by air.

Public Affairs offices at State, Defense and White House go on 24-hour basis.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 22, 1962 Monday

10:30 a. m. Is PHIBRIGLEX-62 a cover to assemble forces for an attack on Cuba?

A. Denied.

10:30 a. m. Regarding Marines from Camp Pendleton in PHIBRIGLEX-62, will they return to Camp Pendleton after the exercise?

A. These Marines will be retained in the area for further training and then returned to Camp Pendleton.

12:00 Are there any extra Marines deployed in the Caribbean other than those involved in PHIBRIGLEX-62?

A. No.

Q. Will the Navy confirm, deny or comment on AP report that Marine reinforcements are being sent to Gtmo?

A. No comment.

2:47 p. m. We have report of Soviet convoy approaching U. S. Atlantic Coast. Is this true?

A. We have no information on such a convoy.

4:50 p. m. Will Navy comment regarding movement of ships out of Charleston?

A. No comment.

8:00 p. m. Secretary of Defense Background briefing for media representatives.

QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 22, 1962 Monday (Cont'd)

Most important points covered:

- a. Objective of quarantine is to prevent entry into Cuba of offensive weapons and to attain the withdrawal of the weapons now in Cuba.
 - b. Ships will be hailed, stopped, and searched. Those carrying offensive weapons will be diverted. Force will be used if necessary to accomplish the mission.
 - c. Announced redeployment of air defense units, reinforcement of Guantanamo, evacuation of dependents in Guantanamo, increased alert status of forces world-wide.
 - d. Described the type missiles now in Cuba and pointed out missile installations on photographs.
 - e. Announced the presence of IL-28 bombers in Cuba and gave a general description of the capabilities of that aircraft.
 - f. Displayed photographs of IRBM sites under construction.
 - g. Announced that there were Soviet bloc ships enroute Cuba.
- Q. When will correspondents be permitted on board ships in quarantine operations and go to Gtmo.
- A. Travel of this type is not being permitted at this time.

QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 22, 1962 Monday (Cont'd)

9:20 p. m. Location of Russian ships headed for Cuba?

A. Will not discuss at this time.

10:15 p. m. Will oil tankers be stopped?

A. Unable to get down to specifics tonight.

10:35 p. m. What was the Navy and Marine strength at Gtmo before reinforcement?

A. No comment.

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EVENTS

October 23, 1962 Tuesday

Executive Committee NSC meets twice, 10:00 a. m. and 6:00 p. m.

7:00 p. m. President signs Proclamation of Interdiction and Executive Order authorizing SECDEF to call up Reserves and retain personnel on active duty.

7:00 p. m. JCS directed CINCLANT to implement wartime quarantine according to rules of engagement provided.

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QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 23, 1962 Tuesday

9:00 a. m. Released seven pictures of Marine reinforcements arriving at Guantanamo.

2:10 p. m. What reason is being given as to why photos shown by the background briefing last night are not being given to the press?

A. Photos are considered classified at this time.

3:15 p. m. When will first intercept take place?

A. Not known.

7:30 p. m. SECDEF Press Conference.

Main points covered:

- a. Announcement of the signing of the Proclamation of Interdiction.
- b. Announcement of effective time of blockade, 10:00 a. m. EDT, 24 October 1962.
- c. Announcement of appointment of Admiral George Anderson as the Executive Agent for Operation of the Quarantine, Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT, as responsible Unified Commander for overall operation.
- d. Announcement that President signed Executive Order authorizing Secretary of Defense to call up Reserves and retain personnel on active duty.
- e. Declined to predict when first intercept would occur and declined to comment on position of Soviet ships.
- f. Explained rules for interdiction.
- g. Discussed offensive missile systems which are in Cuba.

QUERIES

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 23, 1962 Tuesday (Cont'd)

9:35 p. m. Is this a new policy on releasing troop information?

A. No.

Q. Can you comment on troop movements?

A. No.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 24, 1962 Wednesday

10:00 a. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

10:00 a. m. Quarantine becomes effective.

Greek oiler "Sirius" is cleared through quarantine.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 24, 1962 Wednesday (Cont'd)

News Release - Dates, times and location of the arrival of ships carrying dependents from the U. S. Naval Base at Guantanamo.

4:30 p. m. Regarding wire story of a Canadian ship that reached Cuba today, was it stopped and boarded?

A. No comment on this story.

5:00 p. m. Informed Services, JCS and Unified and Specified Commands of twelve types of information considered vital to our national security and not releasable by Department of Defense.

5:45 p. m. Are the Army and Air Force specifically involved in Cuban quarantine operations?

A. We cannot comment on the specific missions or roles of any forces.

6:50 p. m. A troop train of an armored division just passed through Shreveport. Can we release it and photos?

A. Stressed paragraph 5 of security guidance.

7:35 p. m. Four pictures of low-level reconnaissance released.

9:55 p. m. Explain the contradiction between point 3 of security guidance and the release of the information on the 10 missile bases.

A. The guidance concerns general areas in a blanket policy. From time to time as the situation develops, specific information may be judged no longer necessary to be withheld and can then be released. This does not alter the general policy.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 24, 1962 Wednesday (Cont'd)

11:20 p. m. How did it happen that intelligence pictures of Cuba were released in England before they were released here?

A. Referred to State Department.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 24, 1962 Wednesday (Cont'd)

11:20 p. m. How did it happen that intelligence pictures of Cuba were released in England before they were released here?

A. Referred to State Department.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 24, 1962 Wednesday

1:00 a.m. Four pictures of aerial reconnaissance released.

1:30 a.m. Ten pictures of aerial reconnaissance released.

10:40 a.m. Can media representatives visit Naval Base, Key West?

A. That is up to the Commander of the Naval Base. He is responsible for security at that activity.

3:50 p.m. Informed Services, JCS, Unified and Specified Commands that "the responsibility for release of public announcements and public affairs operations of the Department of Defense or any segment thereof regarding Department of Defense activities during current Cuban Quarantine is lodged solely with the ASD(PA). There will be no release of any such information including pictures or film without the approval of the designated office."

4:00 p.m. Mr. Sylvester announced that there were 8-10 bases near various Cuban cities with each base having about four launches; that intelligence sources confirmed at least 30 missiles and more than 20 IL-28 jet fighter bombers present in Cuba; and presence of at least 5000 USSR personnel in Cuba. Announced procedures for submarine surfacing and identification. Announced evacuation of some civilian employees from Guantanamo. Mr. Sylvester refused to comment on whether or not any intercepts had been or were being made. He said he expected that the media and the people would be informed after an interception and boarding had occurred.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 25, 1962 Thursday

7:15 a. m. USS ESSEX in contact with Soviet Tanker BUCHAREST.

9:50 a. m. Photos confirm no deck cargo aboard BUCHAREST.

10:00 a. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

President issues instructions for the interdiction and inspection of non-Bloc ships.

11:06 a. m. COMSECONDFLT assumed surveillance of BUCHAREST (USS NEWPORT NEWS and DD's).

11:40 a. m. USS PIERCE in vicinity of MARUCLA (Lebanese freighter).
USNS UPSHUR, USS DUXBURY BAY, USS DESOTO COUNTY arrived Norfolk, Virginia in the afternoon with 2146 dependents from Naval Base, Gtmo.

2:47 p. m. USS KENNEDY ordered to intercept MARUCLA.

5:00 p. m. Evacuation of dependents from Gtmo completed.

6:30 p. m. CINCLANT directs boarding of MARUCLA.

7:15 p. m. NEWPORT NEWS and DD's cease trailing BUCHAREST.

7:30 p. m. CINCLANT directs USS KENNEDY to locate and board MARUCLA earliest possible.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 25, 1962 Thursday (Cont'd)

7:40 p.m. CINCPACFLT directs movement of 5th MEB at maximum speed of advance.

8:35 p.m. VOLKERFREUND, East German passenger ship with 20 German students bound for Havana cleared through quarantine.

9:07 p.m. USS PIERCE proceeding to intercept MARUCLA.

10:25 p.m. USS PIERCE in vicinity MARUCLA.

Soviet oiler, BUCHAREST, SULACO, UK from Southampton to Kingston, and Polish ship to New Orleans (name unknown) cleared through quarantine.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 25, 1962 Thursday

11:50 a.m. Mr. Sylvester announced that at least a dozen Soviet vessels have turned back because apparently they were carrying offensive weapons. Announced that Navy had intercepted a Soviet tanker proceeding towards Cuba and that it was permitted to proceed without boarding. Encounter took place about 8:00 a.m. EDT 25 October. Ship was Soviet tanker BUCHAREST.

2:30 p.m. Picture of Soviet tanker BUCHAREST released.

5:15 p.m. Mr. Sylvester announced that BUCHAREST was not boarded. Navy reports ship heavily loaded; satisfied that it is an ordinary oil tanker.

Mr. Sylvester reports that there were ships still enroute Cuba but refused to elaborate.

8:40 p.m. Will DOD not identify Cuban based missiles by name, in view of detailed pictures which now have been released.

A. Information cannot be released at this time.

9:50 p.m. Can we release information of a troop movement here?

(El Paso)

A. Explained defense policy on this.

Requests to expand on Mr. Sylvester's statement regarding the Soviet tanker were denied.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 26, 1962 Friday

7:50 a. m. Interception and boarding of MARUCLA by USS J. P. KENNEDY.

8:20 a. m. KENNEDY boarding party returns.

10:00 a. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

10:20 a. m. MARUCLA released and underway for Havana.

During the morning USS HYADES arrived Norfolk, Virginia with 286 dependents from Naval Base, Gtmo.

1:40 p. m. Swedish ship COLLANGATTA passed through quarantine line without clearance.

4:50 p. m. USS SELLARS intercepts UK ship SULACO bound for Kingston from Southampton. Allowed to proceed.

5:45 p. m. USS PERRY intercepts Swedish ship COLLANGATTA, bound from Leningrad to Havana. Cargo potatoes. Allowed to proceed.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 26, 1962 Friday

9:00 a. m. Released seven pictures of evacuees departing Guantanamo.

10:00 a. m. Provided stock pictures of USS KENNEDY and USS PIERCE to media.

10:35 a. m. Mr. Sylvester announced that the Navy had intercepted and boarded the MARUCLA, a Lebanese ship, and that the boarding party was still aboard.

12:00 Noon Mr. Sylvester announced that the MARUCLA had been cleared to proceed. No prohibited material aboard.

3:00 p. m. Pictures of Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of USS PIERCE and USS KENNEDY furnished to media.

3:15 p. m. Have report according to Havana radio that Soviet ship VINITZA arrived this morning at 4:30 a. m. in Havana with a large reception. Can you confirm?

A. We cannot confirm this report at this time. We are checking.

3:20 p. m. I have a report that I know is accurate that U. S. jets have buzzed Cuban airfields at low level today as a demonstration to them of what we could do. They have not fired or done anything except fly over. I want some comment on this without delay and have not been getting any satisfactory response to my queries from the Defense Department so far this evening.

A. U. S. jets have not buzzed Cuban airfields today as a demonstration of what we can do. We have no further comment on this.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

October 26, 1962 Friday Cont'd

3:28 p.m. Are we continuing our aerial surveillance of the missile sites in Cuba?

A. Cannot answer this question under provisions of the guidance put out on 24 October. Mr. Sylvester at a press briefing on 25 October said, "There has been constant surveillance."

4:50 p.m. Have we received fire or casualties in our surveillance efforts over Cuba?

A. We have no information on this at this time.

6:15 p.m. Released information on cargo carried by MARUCLA. Announced the names of the ships which intercepted and trailed BUCHAREST.

9:55 p.m. On AP story by Vern Haghland says the MYLIA of Oslo identified itself to the U.S. destroyer 148 and was allowed to proceed south through the Windward Passage. Can we confirm this contact and provide details?

A. We have no information which would confirm this report.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 27, 1962 Saturday

3:45 a. m. CINCLANTFLT directs interception of Lebanese ship PELLA; not to be boarded unless advised to do so.

8:35 a. m. CTF 136 directs USS MC DONOUGH and LAWRENCE to intercept and trail GROZNY.

10:00 a. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

10:00 a. m. - 11:00 a. m. U-2 reconnaissance plane shot down over eastern Cuba.

10:33 a. m. F8U photo reconnaissance flights ordered.

10:46 a. m. MC DONOUGH on station with GROZNY.

1:20 p. m. F8U reconnaissance flights completed. Aircraft on afternoon flights report ground fire.

2:00 p. m. Fifth MEB sails. ETA Balboa 5 November.

4:00 p. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

Mr. McNamara reports that two low-level reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon by light anti-aircraft and small arms.

9:00 p. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

President approves call-up of 24 troop carrier squadrons of the Air Force Reserve.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 27, 1962 Saturday

A. M. Public Affairs hold meeting with executives and representatives of various media to discuss on-the-spot coverage at Guantanamo and with the quarantine forces.

11:20 a. m. In answer to questions, Mr. Sylvester could not confirm the Havana radio report that a Canadian ship carrying potatoes had passed through the quarantine.

3:00 p. m. What do you have on UPI report that anti-aircraft guns were fired by Cubans at aircraft flying over that country.

A. We have no information on this.

3:35 p. m. Announced that JUPITER were made available to Turkey pursuant to a NATO Council Resolution of December, 1957.

9:20 p. m. Mr. McNamara announces that our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft had been fired on. Announces that he had instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to order to active duty 24 Troop Carrier Squadrons of the Air Force Reserve with their associated support units.

Late P. M. Announced that a military reconnaissance aircraft conducting surveillance over Cuba was missing and presumed lost.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 28, 1962 Sunday

1:05 a. m. CTF 136 directs interception of BELOVODSK during early forenoon. 29 October.

8:45 a. m. CINCLANTFLT directs suspension of the trailing of PELLA.

11:00 a. m. Executive Committee Meeting.

5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade embarked at West Coast ports, enroute Atlantic. Due in Panama 5 November.

11:05 a. m. USS STEINAKER directed to intercept MARITZA.

12:25 p. m. CINCLANTFLT directs no forceful action against any shipping until further notice. Ships to report before taking any action.

1:30 p. m. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to take no forceful action and not to board any ships until further orders.

3:00 p. m. Photos of MARITZA reveal trucks and small drums.

5:14 p. m. MARITZA cleared to proceed.

5:16 p. m. PELLA cleared to proceed.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 28, 1962 . Sunday

A. M. Announced the designations of the units of the Air Force Reserve which were called up.

11:00 a. m. Released picture of Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF.

11:10 a. m. Announced that aerial reconnaissance was continuing.

11:10 a. m. Announced postponement of plans for media to cover Guantanamo and quarantine forces.

1:00 p. m. Released 10 pictures of chronology of build up of Cuban fire missile bases.

Q. Is the missing reconnaissance plane a U-2?

A. We have no information on type of plane.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 29, 1962 Monday

11:38 a.m. USS LAWE in contact with BELOVODSK.

2:15 p. m. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed CINCLANT to conduct 8 low-level reconnaissance flights against offensive missile sites and IL-28 bases. All returned safely.

9:05 p.m. CINCLANTFLT orders no intercepts or challenges from first light 30 October during SEC GEN U. Thant visit to Havana.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 29, 1962 Monday

12:00 Noon Announced that quarantine would remain in effect and ships remain on station until arrangements could be made by United Nations for effective inspection and that aerial reconnaissance was presumed to be continuing.

2:45 p.m. How many ships have passed the quarantine?

A. The tanker and the freighter are the only two ships we can comment on.

3:30 p.m. Can we get the names of some of the pilots who have made the missile base pictures?

A. These names are not available at this time.

4:50 p.m. Has seen story that 6 ships have arrived in Havana, including MARUCLA. Do you have anything on this?

A. Told that Mr. Sylvester is due to hold news briefing after 5:00 p.m.

5:34 p.m. Announced that surveillance flights over Cuba were made today and that all aircraft had returned safely.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 30, 1962 Tuesday

3:40 a.m. P3V from Bermuda ordered to locate and photograph
MIR and KARL MARX at first light.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 30, 1962 Tuesday

11:30 a. m. Mr. Sylvester announced that evaluation of the results of our surveillance of Cuba was continuing and that more time was needed to arrive at conclusive evidence. He also announced that surveillance was not being carried out at the request of SECGEN U. Thant. In answer to query refused to identify the type of aircraft missing over Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

October 31, 1962 Wednesday

8:59 p.m. Joint Chiefs of Staff reinstitute quarantine operations beginning at daybreak 1 November. Ships to be challenged (hailed) and trailed only. No boarding or visit and search or use of force authorized except in self-defense or as directed by higher authority.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

October 31, 1962 Wednesday

4:05 p. m. When will aerial surveillance and/or blockade be resumed?

A. You will recall that the original announcements were to the effect that the blockade would be suspended for two days. We have no information regarding aerial surveillance.

10:00 p. m. Does DOD have any statement on the circumstances of Major Anderson's death, now that U. Thant has said that Castro will return the Major's body?

A. The report by Secretary General U. Thant that the Cuban Government has agreed to return the remains of Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. is the first word that the Department of Defense has had that Major Anderson was shot down over Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 1, 1962 Thursday

Photographic flights over Cuba resumed (6 flights)

6:27 p. m. BELOVODSK underway after being dead in the water since 290955Z.

10:35 p. m. GROZNY Y underway.

The KARL MARX conducted transfer of cargo to the USTYZHNA (Soviet cargo ship homeward bound, departed Cuba 26 October).

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 1, 1962 Thursday

11:30 a.m. Defense spokesman made following statement "In the absence of effective UN arrangements, the Hemisphere Nations have the responsibility for continuing surveillance." He refused to elaborate on the statement.

3:00 p.m. Announced that 'the U.S. conducted a reconnaissance mission over Cuba today. The planes returned without incident. No analysis of the pictures expected before tomorrow morning. "

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 2, 1962 Friday

10:49 a. m. CINCLANTFLT directs that one DD trail MIR, KARL MARX, BELOVODSK, GROZNY.

12:25 p. m. 2F8U and 2 RF-101 photographic flights ordered. Completed at 2:48 p. m.

9:05 p. m. USS MC CAFFERY and FORREST ROYAL ordered to trail KARL MARX and MIR.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

~~SECRET~~
November 3, 1962 Saturday

2:30 a.m. Two Dominican Republic Frigates report to COMSOLANT for operational control.

8:30 a.m. Soviet merchant ship EMELIAN PUGACHEV inspected vicinity Balboa, C. Z. Allowed to proceed.

Photographic flights conducted

7:23 p.m. BELOVODSK enters Havana.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 2, 1962 Friday

9:25 a.m. The Secretary of Defense announced that preliminary analysis of aerial photographs collected on 1 November reconnaissance mission over Cuba provided clear indications that work was proceeding on the dismantling of the missile sites. A spokesman said that launch erectors had been removed, much of the associated equipment removed, cable conduits between control points and the launch pads broken up, concrete pads at the launch erectors appeared to have been broken and that certain areas of the sites had been plowed and bulldozed.

4:30 p.m. Have there been any surveillance flights over Cuba today?

A. We have nothing beyond the statement given out this morning at 0925.

3:15 p.m. In answer to query refused to state if ships had entered Cuban ports while the blockade was lifted or whether any were being passed through the quarantine line.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 3, 1962 Saturday

12 Noon Released 8 pictures of dismantling of missile sites.

6:45 p. m. Released 4 pictures of dismantling of missile sites.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 4, 1962 Sunday

6:35 a.m. GROZNY enters Santiago.

10:10 a.m. 6 RF 101 and 4 high altitude reconnaissance flights
flown. All returned without incident.

8:43 p.m. Argentine SA-16's placed under operational control of
Commander Air Rescue Service, McDill.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 4, 1962 Sunday

2:45 p.m. Do we know if ships are being loaded with Russian missiles to take them out of Cuba? Have any ships been cleared through the quarantine to pick up the missiles? Have there been any new confrontations or inspections?

A. We have no available information on any of the three queries.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 5, 1962 Monday

11:16 a. m. CINCLANT directs 4 flights (F8U) photo reconnaissance.

11:55 a. m. One flight pursued over Cuba.

1:25 p. m. All flights returned safely.

7:00 p. m. USS LEARY intercepts Swedish ship CARIB enroute
Leningrad to Havana. Cargo potatoes. Allowed to proceed.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 5, 1962 Monday

1:10 p.m. AP states that "U.S. authorities" say there is no evidence that the Russians are packing up their atomic capable bomber aircraft in Cuba.

(1) Did DOD sources say this? (2) Is it true?

A. (1) No authorized sources.

(2) No comment.

2:10 p.m. Is it true that the Panama Canal is temporarily closed to commercial traffic and that 27 U.S. warships are passing through it from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

A. We have nothing on the matter. Pointed out that DOD would not comment on any movement or fighting equipment.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 6, 1962 Tuesday

4:25 a. m. CINCLANT reports that movement of Soviet personnel and equipment in Cuba towards sea ports suggests hurried disassembly of equipment for overseas shipment.

12:30 p. m. All photo reconnaissance returned safely (four flights).

1:41 p. m. CINCLANT advised that aerial photography and visual observation of out bound ships are essential because load out of missiles is being rushed.

4:35 p. m. CNO promulgates list of ships of immediate urgent interest expected to leave Cuba.

LABINSK, BRATSK, L. KOMSONAL, KURCHATOV, POLZUNOV,
ALAPAYEVSK, NIKOLAEVSK.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 6, 1962 Tuesday

11:20 a. m. How many boardings have we had to date?

A. One, the boarding of MARUCLA.

11:25 a. m. How many 1L-28's are there in Cuba?

A. We are not discussing the number of any of the offensive weapons in Cuba (Statement of 22 October).

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 7, 1962 Wednesday

November 13, 1962 - Announced that two Venezuelan destroyers were to join Quarantine Force (Delay due to coordination with Government of Venezuela).

Announced that two Argentine Destroyers were to join the Quarantine Force on 8 November.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 7, 1962 Wednesday

3:00 a.m. Two DD's and one SS of Venezuelan Navy placed under operational control of COMSOLANT. Will be underway for Trinidad 8 November. Six ships underway from Cuba: KURCHATOV, ANASOV, LABINSK, POLZONOV, BRATSK, DVINOGORSK.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

~~SECRET~~

November 8, 1962 Thursday

1:25 a.m. CINCLANTFLT orders destroyer intercept of DVINOGORSK.
5:30 a.m. STEINAKER ordered to intercept KURCHATOV.
9:30 a.m. Photo reconnaissance flights ordered. (Returned at 12:05).
5:45 p.m. VOLGOLES sighted by P2V aircraft. Did not respond to signals to uncover deck cargo. VESOLE and N.K. PERRY assigned to intercept, trail and establish contact at first light 9 November.
5:50 p.m. P2V sighted and photographed DVINOGORSK.
8:28 p.m. USS HOLDER alongside ALAPAYEVSK.
8:38 p.m. PERRY intercepts VOLGOLES. Refuses to show missiles.
10:18 p.m. DD assigned to intercept KURCHATOV.

Photographed: KURCHATOV, ANASOV, BRATSK, DVINOGORSK,
VOLOGOLES, ALAPAYESK.

LABINSK underway but not photographed.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 8, 1962 Thursday

5:40 p.m. Mr. Sylvester announced that the U. S. Government had confirmed, through aerial reconnaissance, that Medium Range Ballistic Missile and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile equipment was being removed from Cuba.

5:45 p.m. Released four pictures of Soviet ships departing Cuba.

6:55 p.m. Released three pictures of Soviet ships loading at dock side in Cuba.

Inspections announced 12 November 1962.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 9, 1962 Friday

10:18 a. m. Photo reconnaissance flights ordered. Completed at
1:48 p. m.

Summary of INTERCEPTS - 9, 10 and 11 November

<u>Name</u>	<u>Inspected</u>	<u>Photos</u>	<u>No. of Missiles</u>
LABINSK	Yes	Yes	2
BRATSK	Yes	Yes	2
KOMSOMOL	Yes	Yes	8
KURCHATOV	No	Yes	6 (probable)
ANASOV	Yes	Yes	8
DVINOGORSK	Yes	Yes	4
VOLGOLES	Yes	Yes	7
POLZONOV	No	No	5
ALAPAYESK	Yes	Yes	0

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 9, 1962 Friday

4:10 p.m. Is the statement in Washington Star 'all 40 Soviet missiles 'known' to have been in Cuba will be on high seas by tomorrow' factual and direct?

A. Advised that no such statements made by Defense spokesman.

9:00 p.m. Released five pictures of Soviet submarines in the quarantine area.

Flyover quarantine force by 10 media representatives.

26 media representatives flown to Guantanamo.

Intercepts and inspections announced on 12 November 1962.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 10, 1962 Saturday

1:04 a. m. KARL MARX and POLZONOV underway.

3:08 p. m. All photo reconnaissance flights completed.

November 11, 1962 Sunday

Reinspection of several ships conducted uring the day.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 10, 1962 Saturday

Flyover quarantine force by 12 media representatives.

November 11, 1962 Sunday

4:30 p.m. Released four pictures of uncovered missiles aboard Soviet ships outbound from Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 12, 1962 Monday

9:00 a.m. Photo reconnaissance flights ordered (Returned by 1:55 p.m.).

THEODOR KORNER, ATKARSK, OHKOTSK ordered intercepted.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 12, 1962 Monday

1:55 p.m. How many ships have gone into Cuba in the past two weeks?

A. 29 October to 10 November -

Soviet ships	8
Bloc ships	3
Bloc charter	18
Others	<u>3</u>
Total	32

Since 10 November - 3.

15 media representatives flown to Guantanamo

Announced the inspection of 8 Soviet ships by U.S. Navy ships. Forty-two missiles sighted on these ships.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 13, 1962 Tuesday

9:12 a.m. Photo reconnaissance ordered.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 13, 1962 Tuesday

9:20 a.m. Both Admiral Anderson and Admiral O'Donnell have referred to Soviet submarines operating in Caribbean and Atlantic. Should we assume that they are speaking essentially of the same submarines?

A. They are referring to the same submarines.

2:45 p.m. What is the status of the Argentine destroyers assigned to the Combined Quarantine Force?

A. The Argentine destroyers ARA - ROSALES and ARA - ESPORA are now on their assigned stations.

6:20 p.m.

Q. How many ships passed the quarantine from 24 through 29 October?

A. 14.

Q. What were their nationalities?

A. British, Spanish, Swedish, Norwegian, Lebanese, Greek, German, Czech, Polish, and Soviet.

Q. How many ships were intercepted?

A. Information not available.

Q. How many ships were passed after boarding?

A. One.

Q. Were any ships turned back?

A. No.

11:38 p.m. In answer to query, provided approximate position of intercept of: LABINSK, BRATSK, KOMSOMOL, DVINOGORSK, VOLGOLES.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 14, 1962 Wednesday

7:00 a.m. High altitude reconnaissance flights launched. Low altitude flights cancelled.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 14, 1962 Wednesday

11:05 a.m. In answer to queries regarding the TV interview of Mr. Gilpatric, a Defense spokesman stated that despite the fact that the show had been taped on Saturday, 10 November, the missile count was not verified until just before air time on Sunday, 11 November, DOD released number of missiles counted one half hour before air time.

In answer to queries, stated that nine ships, which were believed to be carrying missiles were inspected alongside.

18 media representatives flown to Guantanamo.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 15, 1962 Thursday

9:43 a.m. Photo reconnaissance flights ordered.

Following Russian ships believed to be enroute Cuba: OKHATSH,
ORENBURG, KASINICV, KRASNOGRAD, KARACHAYEVAK.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 15, 1962 Thursday

10:55 a.m. What are the names of the ships that cleared through quarantine?

A. Names not available.

11:10 a.m. Defense spokesman, in answer to queries, stated that the Defense Department was satisfied that 42 missiles had been removed from Cuba. He quoted Mr. Gilpatric as follows: "We never knew how many missiles were brought into Cuba. The Soviets said there were 42. We have counted 42 going out. We saw fewer than 42 - (that is to say, in Cuba itself). Until we have so-called on-site inspection of the island of Cuba we can never be sure that 42 is the maximum number that the Soviets brought into Cuba."

Refused to comment on the size of Task Force 136 or on the number of IL-28's in Cuba.

11:45 a.m. Is the United States Government satisfied that the objects seen aboard Soviet ships leaving Cuba were truly missiles?

A. We have had hundreds of photographs taken from the air and from ship-board of the destroyers that took part in the alongside procedure in which nine Soviet vessels were given visual and photographic inspection by the U.S. destroyers.

The photographs taken, as well as eyeball reports by naval observers are now being analyzed at all levels of the intelligence community. So far there has not been any overall final assessment.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 15, 1962 Thursday (Cont'd)

Pending that assessment, responsible officials in the Defense Department and in the Government are satisfied, on the basis of evidence to date, that the objects described as missiles aboard the Russian vessels were indeed Soviet missiles. However, these officials are withholding their final determination until the completion of the close technical analysis that is now underway with the full intelligence capabilities of the United States Government.

~~SECRET~~

EVENTS

November 16, 1962 Friday

No reconnaissance flights.

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION

November 16, 1962 Friday

3:19 p.m. Defense spokesman, in answer to queries, refused to comment on whether any reconnaissance planes had been shot at in the last two weeks.

5:15 p.m. As of 5:00 p.m., has there been any interference with out reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba?

A. We have nothing to say on Cuba at this time.

15 media representatives flown to Guantanamo

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS AFTER 16 NOVEMBER 1962:

A. 21 November 1962

Announced that as of 6:45 p. m., 20 November, that the quarantine forces had been ordered to discontinue operations and return to normal operations. The Combined Quarantine Force, the Inter-American Force, ordered to discontinue operations.

Announced that outbound Soviet ships would be located and photographed by aircraft of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces of the Atlantic Fleet if directed.

12-point security guidelines cancelled.

The Secretary of Defense authorized Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to terminate the extension of tours of duty and to release those Reservists called to active duty in connection with the Cuban crisis.

B. Between 17 November and 19 December 33 news media representatives were flown to Guantanamo.

C. 27 November 1962

Phase redeployment of forces in Southeastern United States was announced.

D. On 7 December 1962, 18 news media representatives were flown over Soviet ships outbound from Cuba with 1 L-28 aircraft aboard.

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Ref: 88-FOI-1083/L

Mr. Phil Brenner
The American University
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Dear Mr. Brenner:

This responds to your April 21, 1987, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed with the Department of State and received in this Directorate on June 9, 1988.


The Joint Staff(JS) and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-American Affairs) (DASD(I-A) with National Security Council input have advised us that the enclosed redacted documents are partially responsive to your request. One entire document and portions of the other documents provided have been deleted which are currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 12356, Section 1.3(a)(5) and concern foreign relations and foreign activities of the United States, relating to National Security. Therefore, Major General Richard B. Goetze, Jr, Vice Director, JS, and Mr. Matthew P. Caulfield, Director Inter-American Region, DASD(I-A), Initial Denial Authorities, have denied this information pursuant to 5 USC 552 (b)(1).

You have the right to appeal Major General Goetze and Mr. Caulfield's decision to deny this information. Any such appeal should offer justification to support reversal of the initial denial and should be forwarded within 60 days of the date of this letter to:

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
Directorate for Freedom of Information
and Security Review
Pentagon, Room 2C757
Washington, DC 20301-1400.

All fees have been waived for this response.

Sincerely,



W. M. McDonald
Director
Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Enclosures:
As stated

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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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E REQUESTER

17 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NITZE

SUBJECT: Press Release Justifying Reconnaissance
Overflights of Cuba

You asked for some ideas which might form the body of a press release aimed at legitimating aerial reconnaissance of Cuba. The question in your mind was whether we had done enough to emphasize the "rightness" of our behavior in this regard, especially since there appears no longer to be either IRBMs or MRBMs in Cuba. The presence of IL-28s and the possibility of military build-up in other regards are harder to use as justifications.

Attached is a very rough draft, which might be used as a starter. It is based on the conclusions that two basic ingredients go into the creation of acceptability of our aerial surveillance activities: (1) The appearance of "rightness"; and (2) the appearance of determination to continue the practice despite all opposition.

John T. McNaughton

Attachment

As stated above

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ROUGH DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

re LEGITIMACY OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA

Aerial surveillance of Cuba will continue.

The nations of the Western Hemisphere were assured by the Soviet Union that there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. Solely by virtue of aerial surveillance of the island, the nations of the Western Hemisphere learned that this assurance was false and that both medium-range bombers and medium-range missiles were being deployed in Cuba. The capability of the Cuban regime to employ deception in this very important area was therefore convincingly demonstrated. The nations of the Western Hemisphere will not permit this capability to be exercised again. Aerial surveillance is required to give assurances that the capability is restrained.

The IL-28 bombers are still in Cuba, in varying degrees of assembly. These aircraft, with a high-level range of 1600 (?) miles, can penetrate the defenses of every nation bordering the Caribbean Sea. Especially, they pose a serious strategic threat to our Latin-American neighbors, who have no adequate defense against them. What is being done with and about these bombers, from day to day,

must be known by the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation on October 23 authorizes whatever action is needed to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba. This resolution, consistent with the UN Charter, was adopted to permit the self-defense of the Caribbean nations against the bombers and missiles in Cuba. The aerial surveillance now being conducted is pursuant to that resolution and is consistent with the Charter.

Aerial reconnaissance is harmless. The aircraft are not armed. Except for a few low-level flights, conducted to check out places which other photography or intelligence indicate may be suspicious, the flights are at altitudes which render them entirely unobtrusive. The pilots of the low-flying aircraft have been instructed to avoid flying over populated areas whenever their assigned photographic objective permits it.

The United States is willing to halt aerial surveillance as soon as an adequate substitute for it is found. Mr. Khrushchev in his letter to the President of October 27th (?) assured that adequate arrangements would be made to ensure that offensive weapons were gotten out, and kept out, of Cuba. These arrangements have not been forthcoming.

The United States has offered to the UN the aircraft and photographic equipment necessary to conduct unobtrusive surveillance of Cuba. Cuba has blocked this UN activity as it has blocked other attempts by the UN to provide the arrangements needed to provide assurances that offensive weapons are kept out of Cuba.

Aerial surveillance by the United States will continue -- as needed to fulfill the resolution of the Organ of Consultation and as needed to provide the deficiencies of Mr. Khrushchev's commitment of October 27th (?) until other arrangements can be made to assure the nations of the Western Hemisphere that offensive weapons will not be based in Cuba.



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

12 November 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Suggested DOD Position on Ball Memorandum to the President

I. "We would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate on pressure on Cuba."

DOD concurs; but recommends making the shift explicit through Presidential or State news release. Furthermore, we should have the Russians state publicly that the remaining weapons belong to Cuba. We should also press the Russians to withdraw their personnel from operational control or active support of existing weapons. This is essential because without Russian support the SAM sites would be inoperable and furthermore a possible subsequent U.S. action against SAM's, anti-aircraft, or IL-28's would then not be a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation.

II. Discussion

The basic Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement calls for the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba and the establishment of adequate inspection. Our principal criticism of the Ball paper is that it emphasizes the problem of the removal of the IL-28's, and does not adequately cover the problem of obtaining ground inspection. In our opinion, the removal of the IL-28's is secondary to the problem of inspection.

While the achievement of our goals is not essential within a day or even a few days, it is essential that the United States maintain pressure on Castro until these agreements are fulfilled or a significant change in the Cuban regime is achieved.

III. Alternative Courses of Action

As noted by Mr. Ball the four remaining courses of action are not mutually exclusive. Therefore, we propose to comment on the four courses separately and then propose a course of action which

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200lines two and possibly three of the four alternatives.

A. Quarantine

The quarantine which was put into effect by Presidential Proclamation on October 23 to date has proved to be an effective and flexible instrument for applying pressure in Cuba. Enforcement procedures have and will provide tactical flexibility, enforcement can be suspended, maintained or if necessary extended (to P.L.). It is by far the most effective instrument available in the present crisis. We believe the quarantine should not be "removed" until the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements are fulfilled.

Arguments Pro

The removal of the quarantine, short of compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements, would make it difficult to justify re-establishment of the quarantine at a later date.

There is at the present time broad international support for U.S. demands for adequate on-site inspection. If we remove the quarantine with that issue unresolved, we will find it difficult if not impossible to reopen this sanction as an appropriate pressure two or three weeks from now. We could not then expect to have the broad international support which we have today.

C. Reinforced Aerial Surveillance

Mr. Ball suggests that instead of relaxing the blockade, we should undertake a systematic and unrelenting air reconnaissance of Cuba both high and low until such time as:

- (1) Castro yielded on inspection and the removal of the IL-28's.
- (2) Castro was overthrown or,

(3) [REDACTED]

While the bill proposal is superficially attractive because it cases present problems, in fact, it merely postpones the difficult decisions. We believe it extremely unlikely that Castro will be brought down merely by overflights. Therefore, after a few weeks or continued low level flights, we would find ourselves in a position where either (a) Castro has not taken action against the aircraft and the United States is no nearer its objective, or (b) our reconnaissance aircraft have been fired upon, possibly losing one or more aircraft with a resulting heightening of domestic and international tensions.

It is very likely that Castro would withhold his fire and make a political appeal against "Imperialistic U.S. aggression", claiming that such harassment far exceeded any legitimate requirements for aerial inspection. (Current Defense Department studies show that adequate inspection could be achieved by approximately 8 high altitude flights per month and a limited number of low altitude flights to check suspicious events.

The continued positioning of IL-28 aircraft at present airfields and their inactivity would serve to undercut any need for such a large low level reconnaissance effort.

There are innumerable details which would have to be carefully planned if the masquerade of surveillance was to be maintained to justify the low level flights. For example, we would have to gather a very large portion of existing reconnaissance aircraft. If we use non-reconnaissance aircraft, the Cubans might be expected to recognize the difference and shoot at our fighters so as to make a propaganda point that these aircraft were not "reconnaissance aircraft".

Any of these courses will be more difficult two or three weeks from today than they are today.

We should maintain a posture that is in accordance with our position as the major responsible world power. The refusal of the quarantine combined with [REDACTED] flight is in response to Castro's rebuff of the UN request for ground inspection is not a change of action that dignifies our position.

D. Solution through Security Council Arrangement. The Proposal of Ambassador Stevenson.

Ambassador Stevenson's approach does not cover the problem of long term assurances beyond an ex post facto check of the proposed Soviet and Cuban statements. Therefore, we propose to change point 4. as follows:

4. We will temporarily suspend enforcement of the quarantine and provide short term assurances to Cuba against invasion despite only partial Soviet performance. Such assurances will be operative while important progress is being made toward the achievement of long term safeguards. These could be achieved through assurances and appropriate inspection worked out on a regional basis. On the completion of successful negotiations to achieve such a regional arrangement, the United States will remove the quarantine and will provide suitable long term guarantees in keeping with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

IV. Summary

The Ball paper places major emphasis upon the problem of bomber removal. It does not provide any solution to the problem of obtaining verification through ground inspection or long term safeguards.

[REDACTED] On Friday, November 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-affirmed their views on ground inspection: "There is no adequate substitute for on-ground site inspection in Cuba." We concur in this view. If pursued, State's plan would weaken our most effective instrument, the quarantine, for harassing aerial flights, an action which may not even solve the IL-28 problem.

V. Recommendation

A. The [REDACTED] flight proposal be rejected.

B. Immediate action:

(1) Release Presidential or State Department release, earlier coordinated, restating U.S. objectives and suspending enforcement of the quarantine for a short time.

(2) Authorize Governor Stevenson to attempt to seek agreement such as he proposed, subject to the modifications outlined above.

C. Contingency Action

In order of priority depending on Cuban behavior:

(1) Enforce the existing blockade. A contingency statement should be prepared for State or Secdefense in case Castro makes a public statement that he will not cooperate under any circumstance. Recommend action: immediate declaration that U.S. quarantine will be enforced, beginning 48 hours later. This should permit Khrushchev to disengage gracefully if he wishes to do so.

(2) If necessary, extend the blockade to FOL.

(3) 

Paul R. Nitze

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Courses of Action Open to U. S. in Cuban Situation

A/ If USSR agrees to remove IL-28s, U. S. will

- 1) lift quarantine and terminate 10/23 proclamation;
- 2) continue air surveillance - without further announcement - in part to guard against possibility that some offensive weapons remain in Cuba;
- 3) withhold registering with SC-UN declaration confirming U. S. assurance against invasion of Cuba until agreement has been reached on "suitable safeguards" in support of Soviet undertaking to halt further introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Such safeguards should include some international "presence" in Cuba - UN, OAS or Caribbean Peace Commission - and should include some reciprocal features - such as inspection of suspected refugee training areas in Central America - as a basis for gaining Castro's consent. The latter might also be obtained as part of the Latin America nuclear-free zone proposal.

B/ If USSR refuses to remove IL-28s, U. S. will

- 1) continue limited quarantine by boarding, as well as intercepting and hailing all ships enroute to Cuba, applying such procedures first to Free World non-Soviet charter ships, next to Free World ships on charter to Soviet, then to Bloc ships and finally to Soviet ships;
- 2) continue air surveillance with announcement as to its necessity dictated by absence of on-site verification of offensive weapons removal and presence of IL-28 bomber threat;
- 3) treat assurance against invasion of Cuba in President's letter of October 27th as not in effect because of non-performance by Soviet.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

November 13, 1962

Memorandum for the Tuesday Planning Group

Attached is a copy of a paper entitled "Possible Effects of Cuban Crisis on future Soviet military posture and Policy implications for the U. S.", prepared by Tom Wolfe and Andy Marshall. It poses a number of interesting questions that deserve a good deal of work. I will keep you informed as to progress we make with the intelligence community in addressing these questions.

Henry S. Rowen
Deputy Assistant Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CUBAN CRISIS ON FUTURE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE & POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

I. Introduction

The Cuban crisis undoubtedly has brought into sharp focus for the Soviet leadership a number of serious problems concerning the Soviet Union's military posture and its adequacy for support of Khrushchev's political strategy. To mention a few, there are such problems as: how to erase the US margin of strategic superiority; what choice to make between expensive space programs and strengthening of strategic forces; what mix to choose between offensive weapons systems and defensive systems, such as a costly AICBM program; how to develop better capabilities for overseas projection of Soviet military forces; what further allocation of resources to military purposes will the Soviet economy stand, etc.

Some, perhaps most of these problems antedate the Cuban affair itself. In fact, the Cuban MRBM/IRBM deployment may have been in part a quick fix attempt to redress the strategic imbalance. Its failure--with consequent damage to the Soviet Union's world power image and to the credibility of the Soviet strategic deterrent--will certainly bring additional pressures on the Soviet leadership to reassess their position on major questions of state and defense policy. This reassessment could be complicated by differences within the leadership, possibly exacerbated by the Cuban affair.

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The next few months to a year may therefore be an exceedingly critical period--a kind of cross-roads of decision for the Soviet leadership, with significant implications for the future of the East-West struggle. Even a decision to stand pat and make no major changes in their present military posture and programs in response to the Cuban experience would, of course, be significant.

It is important for us to have as full an understanding as possible of the climate in which major Soviet military policy decisions may be taken and of the alternative courses open to them--together with the costs and constraints which would press upon their choices.

This is important not only in order to anticipate as best we can the range of choices open to the Soviets and their implications for our own defense policy, but also in order to influence Soviet decisions, if possible, in directions most favorable to our own interests.

The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the principal factors which will bear upon Soviet decision-making in the area of military policy in the period ahead, and to suggest lines of study that it may be profitable to pursue. Many uncertainties are inherent in the problem at the start. Some of them may be resolved over time as on-going Soviet actions and decisions manifest themselves either openly or through our intelligence coverage. Other uncertainties will undoubtedly persist. One of the incidental purposes of the paper is to suggest indicators of Soviet choices in one direction or another that may prove useful in the process of preparing intelligence estimates on the Soviet military posture.

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II. The Cuban Background -- Why the Missile Deployment?

A useful first step in examining possible changes in the Soviet military posture which may be made in the wake of the Cuban experience would seem to be an analysis of why the Soviets chose to deploy a nuclear threat on the US flank in the first place.

Obvious military advantages would stem from a Cuba-based missile force which could bring a sizeable portion of US strategic striking power under a no-warning attack, or threaten American cities with destruction. Such a force--quickly emplaced and utilizing plentiful medium-range missiles to augment the role of relatively scarce ICBM's in the Soviet inventory--would help restore the balance of strategic forces. It would increase the credibility of Soviet deterrance, improve Soviet pre-emptive capability, which has been a matter of keen concern to the military leadership, and it might even promise to draw some fire away from the Soviet Union itself in the event of war.

However, a plausible theory of the Cuban missile deployment can clearly not be based on military grounds alone. The attainment of major political leverage for the Soviet Union on such issues as Berlin and overseas bases, satisfaction of Cuban pressures for a deterrent against US invasion, the driving of a divisive wedge between the US and its alliance partners, intra-Bloc politics forcing the Soviet Union to adopt a more vigorous role as protector of revolutionary movements, internal Soviet politics--all of these and other factors may have weighed in some measure on the Soviet decision to deploy an offensive weapons capability to Cuba in the face of US warnings as to the gravely provocative character of such a move.

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A key problem of analysis is to determine the relative weight of the various policy calculations which may have lain behind the Soviet attempt to confront the US with a missile fait accompli in Cuba. To pose two broad alternatives: Was improvement of the military-strategic posture of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the US the compelling imperative behind the Soviet move? Or was the move primarily a bold gamble to obtain major political leverage, with the missile bases regarded as blue chip bargaining counters to strengthen the Soviet negotiatory position on a range of issues--Berlin, overseas bases, non-interference with the Castro regime, etc?

If the former were the case--with the missile deployment undertaken despite the high risks inherent in such a move--this would suggest that the motivation to strengthen the Soviet military posture will not be diminished, but in fact further enhanced by the abortive Cuban experience. Hence, one could look for a continuation of strenuous and perhaps still more ingenious efforts to repair the strategic power balance.

On the other hand, if improvement of the Soviet military posture had been looked upon as only incidental to a primarily political gamble in Cuba from which the Soviets were prepared to withdraw in case of bumps on the head--negotiating as they backed off, then major post-Cuban efforts to enhance their military posture and willingness to devote large additional resources to this purpose would seem somewhat less likely. In fact, there might even be a disposition to look more seriously for political solutions of a kind which might be accompanied by levelling off or reduction of military effort--a Berlin settlement, non-aggression pacts, new European security arrangements, arms control agreements, etc.

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It is of course quite possible that the Cuban missile venture was born of a convenient union between a felt need to improve the Soviet military posture over the long pull and the requirements of a political strategy with more immediate objectives in view. In this case--perhaps the more likely one--it will be very difficult to sort out and assign a relative weight to the various Soviet policy calculations involved. Nevertheless, while an attempt to reconstruct Soviet policy with regard to the Cuban venture may cast little direct light on future Soviet military policy decisions, it should furnish some insights of at least indirect value.

A brief discussion of a number of further considerations relevant to a study of why the Soviets sent missiles to Cuba is attached at Annex 1.

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III. Some Alternative Soviet Military Choices

In the aftermath of the Cuban crisis, there are a variety of courses the Soviets could take in the development of their military posture. One course might be to continue essentially unchanged a deliberate and conservative buildup within the general force structure and budgetary patterns which have hitherto obtained. On the other hand, as indicated in the preceding discussion, failure of the Cuban effort could stimulate vigorous attempts to offset its adverse effects, with attendant possibility of significant changes in present military programs.

These changes might range from reallocation of funds among various military claimants, keeping within existing budgetary constraints, to substantial overall increases in defense spending which would go to strengthening priority programs--such as those aimed at redressing the strategic imbalance between U.S.-Soviet strategic forces. None of the choices are likely to be easy, since the competition for resources between defense and economic requirements has already been a troubled issue within the Soviet bureaucracy.

With regard to assessing Soviet reactions, which at best may be only partly visible in the months ahead, special attention needs to be given to development of indicators which will alert the U.S. to important shifts in Soviet military programs. Some ideas of what to look for are included in the following discussion of the main Soviet alternatives.

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1. Measures to Redress the Current Strategic Imbalance

It seems likely that measures to improve the current strategic nuclear force relationship and to restore the somewhat tarnished power image of the Soviet Union would be at the top of the post-Cuban agenda. Various routes would be open for consideration, involving different lead times, varying demand on resources, and alternative emphasis on the major mission areas. The general trend of the Soviet defense effort for the past few years has shown a rise in expenditures for the strategic attack and air defense missions, which according to U.S. intelligence estimates now account for about one-half of total mission expenditures, with ground and naval missions accounting for the other half.* A further readjustment

*The latest tentative intelligence estimate by CIA on Soviet military expenditures shows the following trend in mission-associated expenditures between 1958 and 1962.

	<u>1958</u>		<u>1962</u>	
		Rubles (Bil, 1955 Prices)		Rubles (Bil, 1955 Prices)
	<u>Percent</u>		<u>Percent</u>	
Ground Mission	49	4.4	33	3.9
Naval Mission	19	1.7	15	1.8
Air Defense Mission	16	1.5	26	3.0
Strategic Attack Mission	<u>16</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>3.0</u>
	100%	9.0	100%	11.8

(Mission-related expenditures are estimated to represent about 65% of total defense expenditures. They exclude such costs as R&D, general support, etc.).

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
of this pattern to favor the strategic attack mission, and perhaps the air defense mission--both of which in the Soviet view affect the strategic force equation--might be undertaken. The time factor--which program changes would most rapidly improve the Soviet position?--would probably be an important consideration.

Some specific program changes which might be contemplated are:

a. Step Up the ICBM Program.

This would involve increased production of ICBM's, expansion of the site construction program, acceleration and improvement of hardening measures, readiness, etc. Decisions might involve choice between proven earlier generation missiles and improved models not ready for production and deployment, with attendant programming difficulties. An attempt to speed the incorporation of super-megaton warheads into operational missile systems could be an aspect of the Soviet program.

A major Soviet effort to catch up with the U.S. in the area of strategic weapons, even if decisions were taken now, would probably not show up in substantial increases over the presently estimated Soviet ICBM program in less than about two years. It would almost certainly require a sizeable increase in the military budget, unless other programs were ruthlessly pared.



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b. Expansion of Missile-Launching Sub Program.

This is a possible companion measure to an ICBM speed-up which would offer a way to increase strategic strike capabilities by building on an established program. Results in such a program would, however, be felt less soon than in the case of ICBM acceleration. Among indicators which might signal Soviet decisions to go ahead faster in this area would be increased emphasis on submerged-launch subs more comparable to the Polaris type, an increase in test-firing schedules of associated missiles, and deployment of such systems near the U.S. In this connection, Soviet activity with regard to possible deployment of a forward submarine base in Cuba would also be pertinent.

c. Redeployment of MRBM/IRBM Forces.

Although the Soviet effort to enhance their strategic reach and striking power by deployment of these missiles to Cuba failed, it should not be overlooked that they might try the same method again, though probably in some other area. Shifts in deployment to cover additional areas around the Soviet periphery, including Alaska, might be undertaken. On the whole, this sort of quick fix seems to be of marginal utility, however, so far as concerns a substantial increase in the direct strategic threat to the U.S.

d. Acceleration of AICBM Program.

Acceleration of the Soviet program to develop and deploy an AICBM system might be a Soviet choice intended to yield important psychological impact, as well as having an effect on U. S. strategic superiority. Even if claims ran ahead of actual accomplishment, the

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Soviets might feel there were important advantages in taking the lead in this aspect of the strategic race. However, difficult decisions of deployment--defend cities or military targets? zonal or point defense? coordinate use with air defenses?--would probably tend to crowd upon the Soviets before they were technically ready to commit themselves to great resource demands in this area.

Indicators to watch for would include increased activity and construction at the Kamchatka Peninsula portion of the ICBM test range, nuclear-associated developments, increased activity at Sary Shagan, and deployment of ABM installations as the probable precursor of AICBM systems.

e. Increased ASW Program.

Efforts to improve Soviet ASW capabilities could represent an additional avenue for improvement of their strategic position, since a major objective of such a program would probably be to reduce the effectiveness of the U.S. Polaris system.

2. "Space Spectacular" Measures.

A second broad area of possible Soviet response to Cuba might be to strive for some new space demonstration which could be exploited for its psychological value as has been the case in the past. A serious attempt to try for a military space advantage might also be weighed, although the uncertain results, the lead times and the diversion of resources from other efforts to build up solid military muscle would probably give the Soviets reason to pause before committing themselves too deeply in this direction.

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Should they seek a military space advantage, their efforts might be directed toward a bombardment satellite system employing super-megaton weapons, a manned space station, anti-satellite systems, etc.

3. Measures to Improve Overseas Capabilities.

One of the lessons of Cuba which could have impressed itself on Soviet planners is the need for development of forces better suited for overseas projection of Soviet military pressure than those which were available to them in the Cuban crisis. This has long been a gap in the Soviet military posture, and it is not likely that any measures immediately within their capability could do much to change the basic inferiority in which they find themselves in this respect vis-a-vis the great maritime powers of the Atlantic Alliance.

However, the Soviets might conclude that the time for a start in this direction is long overdue. Measures which they might set in motion could include development of improved naval capabilities for support of long-range military operations and improved capabilities for long-range air supply of military operations overseas. An increase in Soviet acquisition of commercial bottoms could represent another aspect of this problem to which attention would seem important.

4. Program and Force Cutbacks.

The Soviets could not, of course, begin to undertake major program efforts in all the directions listed above, even if they had far greater resources at their disposal than is the case. In fact, if only part of the add-on programs were contemplated, a necessary

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corollary would almost certainly be to decide on program and force cuts elsewhere. This is an exceedingly difficult process in any bureaucracy, the Soviet one being no exception.

To make great increases in the strategic area, corresponding cuts would apparently have to come from the ground forces, and supporting air and surface navy missions, which have already been effected by military reforms of the past few years. There was much resistance among the military to Khrushchev's January 1960 reforms, based on the idea of fewer men - more nuclear fire power. The military wanted to keep both, and to a considerable extent they did succeed in modifying Khrushchev's program.

A new attempt now to shift military programs and force structure in a radically changed direction would undoubtedly generate great cross-pressures among contending elements within the Soviet defense bureaucracy. -- A not unlikely outcome could be some patching and paring of existing forces -- but no sweeping changes that would cut too deeply into any major set of interests and thus upset a delicate bureaucratic equilibrium. This is among the constraints upon Soviet response to which attention should be given.

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IV. Costs and Constraints.

Should the Soviets decide to undertake major shifts in their current military programs, it will not be easy to do so. Current programs, as noted above, have a momentum of their own. The Soviets will have to find ways of stopping some of them and shifting resources to the new programs they may decide upon. This takes time. Thus, even if decisions are made soon it would be some time before U. S. intelligence could first begin to see signs of the changes. However, the Soviets may announce in one way or another some of the changes in order to maximize the short run effect they may achieve. For example, they may announce a military budget increase, or may claim and demonstrate anti-satellite capabilities.

Whatever the Soviets choose to do concerning their future military programing, these choices will be conditioned by a variety of economic constraints. They can increase their aggregate military effort only by reducing expenditures elsewhere. However, we need to know more about the particular programs in the civilian sector most likely to be affected by an increase in specific military programs. For example, will a major increase in the Soviet ICBM program most likely lead to a big reduction in housing construction? What would be the dislocating effects of further military increases on the machinery and equipment sectors of the Soviet economy, etc.?

The Soviets currently have a manpower constraint, especially in those age groups most suitable for military service. How will this operate to effect their choice of military programs?

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There are also a number of other specific constraints on program changes. Of special importance are lead times involved in decisions to initiate program changes, lead times in getting the new programs started, including the lead times involved in stopping ongoing programs so that resources can be devoted to the newer programs, etc.

The Soviet space program directly competes for resources that could go into an accelerated ICBM program. The space program also competes for resources important to AICEM programs. Soviet decisions on these three programs may be especially interrelated.

In order to get some idea of the economic problems involved for the Soviets we need to have cost estimates made of the alternative choices before them. We also need to have assembled as much information as possible on specific resource constraints and program tradeoffs required, e.g., space vs ICBM. As part of this costing effort, the cost of the Cuban missile and bomber forces as compared with a roughly equivalent ICBM missile force based in the Soviet Union should be estimated. Such an estimate might be of help in deciding why the Soviets went into the Cuban buildup.

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IV. How Can the US Influence Changes in Soviet Military Posture?

Consideration of US moves to influence the direction that the Soviet defense effort may take raises the prior question: In what direction would the US prefer them to go? It also requires recognition of the influence on Soviet decisions is uncertain at best, and will probably be marginal in most circumstances now foreseeable.

With respect to US preferences, no very clear picture is at hand. For example, at one level of preference, is a stable deterrent relationship with force "parity" preferred by the US over a policy that seeks to maintain US strategic superiority as long as possible? At another level of detail, would the US prefer the Soviets to make large defensive outlays in AICBM's or put the equivalent effort somewhere else in offensive systems? If AICBM's are the preferred course from a US viewpoint, then would it be better if they were deployed to defend cities or military targets, and so on?

This is an area that requires careful study and some minimum consensus before much can be done to choose US moves to influence Soviet military posture decisions. However, a few tentative guidelines for US preferences might be put as follows:

1. Prefer a defensive orientation rather than offensive emphasis in Soviet posture.

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2. Prefer slow-reacting to quick-reacting strategic forces.
3. Prefer smaller numbers of well-controlled and protected nuclear delivery forces to larger numbers of less controlled and more poorly protected forces.
4. Prefer the Soviet Union to orient its military forces toward the Eurasian continent rather than having their main thrust shifted to the US and overseas objectives.

This is a minimal list of guidelines, on which there may well be some dispute. It probably ought to be refined and extended.

In keeping generally with these "principles", some possible US moves which might influence Soviet decisions in various areas of military policy are discussed below. It is by no means clear whether some of these moves would be in the US interest at all, at least not before having examined them in great depth. Throughout, the basic assumption is made that the Soviets are going to carry out a defense program at least as large, if not larger, than the present one--and that the aim of US moves is merely to influence the program in preferred directions.

Soviet Strategic Forces

- The best US move to discourage the Soviets from a stepped-up numbers race in ICBM's would be to make clear that the US is willing and better able to afford this kind of game than the USSR. In this connection, it would be important to make the point that the Soviets cannot hope to pull away from us in a missile race by sprinting, since we have the standby capacity to increase our own programs--Minuteman,

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Polaris, etc--faster than the Soviets could hope to catch up.

- Short of specific arms control agreements which might place agreed limits on strategic forces, there are probably opportunities in various negotiating environments to foster Soviet interest in better command and control arrangements, more stable forces, etc.

- US emphasis on improving ASW capabilities would be a move which might affect Soviet decisions on missile-launching subs.

- Other US moves might be to deflect Soviet effort from strategic strike force increases to other areas less critical from a US viewpoint--air defense, space, maintenance of large ground forces, etc. These are touched on below.

Soviet Air Defense

- US moves should encourage the Soviets to continue the heavy emphasis they have given to air defense, and in fact to help persuade them if possible that this is the prime area into which their efforts to balance the strategic equation should go.

- One way of doing this would be to demonstrate to the Soviets that the coming of the missile age does not mean they can lower their defense against aircraft. A clear US interest in the continued employment of manned bombers would help make this point. New problems might be posed for the Soviet air defenses--such as low altitude, supersonic penetrators like SLAM, CLAM, etc. Overseas-based US weapons could be of special value in diversifying the air-breathing threat to Soviet defenses.

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- US moves should perhaps encourage the Soviets to make a maximum effort to defend their cities with early AICBM deployment, not only because of the resource drain from other programs, but because this would least interfere with accomplishment of preferred US retaliatory options against the Soviet Union. At the same time, of course, the US would have to think about its own missile defense and penetration aids programs.

Space

- Diversion of major Soviet resources and effort from strategic strike force improvements in the near time-frame might be brought about by encouraging a still larger Soviet space effort, since space and missiles would be competitive for many of the same resources. However, in the longer-term, the possible military pay-offs of such Soviet effort might be risky for the US, particularly if the US had not made comparable military space efforts.

- The most direct way to influence the Soviets in the space area would probably be by the challenge of accomplishments--and the size of space budgets. It would not automatically follow, of course, that an increased US challenge would elicit a Soviet boost in space expenditure; it might have the opposite effect, and lead them to give up many space activities for more concentration on directly applicable military programs.

Soviet Ground Forces

- Reduction of Soviet ground forces, still maintained at strength levels which appear considerably in excess of potential requirements

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in Eurasia, would represent a means for the Soviets to free resources for other missions, providing the high internal resistance of the Soviet military leaders to such a move could be overcome.

- It might therefore be in the US interest--short of a situation in which extensive arms reduction agreements obtained--to encourage the maintenance of large Soviet ground forces in order to keep an estimated third of Soviet military mission expenditures tied down in this manner. Strong NATO forces--necessary in any case against the Soviet military threat in this area--would probably provide the necessary stimulus for the Soviets to keep their ground forces levels high.

- US moves with respect to the large medium range missile forces which the Soviets maintain poised against Europe require very thoughtful study. In the wake of Cuba, the Soviets might attempt to exploit these forces for politico-military pressure on Europe more than they have done hitherto--as compensation, perhaps, for their long-range strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the US. Both military and political preparations (perhaps multilateral MRBM force for NATO and frank disclosure of threat dimensions to our European allies), may be necessary to reduce the impact of any major Soviet exploitation of their large MRBM/IRBM forces.

Soviet Secrecy Barriers

- Because Soviet secrecy has been to the USSR a major military asset, with an intimate bearing on Soviet military posture, the question is

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pertinent: How should the US try to influence Soviet decisions in respect to preservation of secrecy?

- US moves should probably be taken to exploit the large role played by air surveillance in the Cuban matter in sparing the world a far worse crisis later on, had the missiles not been detected early, etc. The establishment of a kind of de facto acceptance of surveillance might be followed by attempts to make it a normative mode of international life and to give additional sanction to US efforts to deal with Soviet secrecy.

- In connection with air surveillance generally, a US move to be given serious thought now would be some kind of recon program over Communist China--justified perhaps on the grounds that clandestine development of a nuclear capability in China would be a "public menace" comparable to the importation of nuclear weapons into Cuba, and hence timely knowledge of it essential to keeping the peace. Such a program involving China might be given tacit assent by the Soviets--possibly even a private photo-sharing deal worked out--although the odds are probably high against this eventuality.

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ANNEX 1 - FACTORS BEARING ON SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT TO CUBA

The initial Soviet decision to deploy offensive missiles to Cuba apparently was made as early as last spring, and certainly--considering lead times involved--not later than early summer. Various aspects of this decision and its timing are of interest in attempting to reconstruct Soviet policy calculations which may have led to the deployment.

Question of Timetable

For example, with respect to Soviet political objectives, was the missile build-up planned to coincide with a Soviet-initiated crisis elsewhere--such as new demands on Berlin? According to one interpretation of the evidence, the Soviets did have a rather precisely coordinated timetable--with new pressures on Berlin, conspicuously "postponed" until after the US November elections, scheduled to coincide with "unveiling" of the missile threat in Cuba. Soviet public and private denials of any intention to furnish offensive weapons to Cuba might be seen as a further deceptive device to help carry off a well-timed surprise. According to another interpretation, however, the Soviets could not have counted on the missile build-up remaining hidden long enough to permit such precise timing. Consequently, the inference drawn is that the Soviets may have had in mind no single, specific objective like a new squeeze on Berlin, but rather may have been banking on the missile deployment to open up for them a range of opportunities for pressure on the US.

A useful task of analysis would be to test these alternative interpretations, since other implications flow from them. For example, if a precise time-table

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involving Berlin were the case, it would seem more likely that Khrushchev had his eye primarily on the political ball, with the missile deployment representing a "quick fix" to shore up the Soviet strategic posture during an anticipated levying of new political demands on Berlin. A greater disposition to trade-off the Cuban missiles for major political gains would also be implied. On the other hand, if the missile deployment were set in the context of general improvement of the Soviet deterrent and negotiatory posture, with no specific time-table to be met, it would seem more likely that the Soviets counted upon leaving the missiles in place and that a lasting alteration in the strategic balance had been high in their calculations.

Neither hypothesis, of course, rules out the possibility that the Soviets may have hoped for a US response which would allow them to reap specific political gains while at the same time preserving a significant addition to their strategic posture. This leads to another important task of analysis-- to examine the likely Soviet estimate of US response to the Cuban missile deployment.

Soviet Pre-Crisis Estimate of US Response

It seems obvious on the face of it that the Soviets badly miscalculated American response to the missile buildup. Some expectation that the US might resort to naval blockade seems indicated by Khrushchev's private remarks-- prior to the flare-up of the crisis--on the matter of interference with shipping on the high seas. On the whole, however, the Soviets seem to have calculated that the US would take up a negotiating stance, rather than precipitating a confrontation of force over the missile question.

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On the matter of US willingness to risk general war, or to launch an immediate attack on Cuba in response to the missile deployment, it would seem plausible to suppose that neither of these possible reactions had weighed significantly in the initial Soviet calculations. Otherwise, in light of subsequent developments, it seems unlikely the Soviets would have attempted a nuclear/missile buildup in the first place. It is not clear how appreciably the Soviet view of the general war danger changed as the crisis developed, although their concern about invasion certainly seems to have risen sharply.

Anent the general war question, Khrushchev has apparently operated for some time on the assumption--or conviction--that the US would not risk nuclear war except under the most extreme provocation. US actions over time in moving from a strategy of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible and controlled response", Khrushchev's encounters with the President, apparent reluctance of the US government to become militarily involved in Cuba again after the Bay of Pigs adventure--these and other factors may have strengthened Khrushchev's conviction that a speedily engineered missile deployment in Cuba would not be taken by the US as a provocation extreme enough to merit the risk of nuclear war. In Khrushchev's own book, of course, it is evident that Cuba was not worth the risk of nuclear war to the Soviet Union.

Reaction to US Response

When the US responded as it did to the discovery of the missile sites, Khrushchev--at some point in the tense latter days of October--may have suffered

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a sudden collapse of confidence in his estimate of US willingness to face nuclear war over Cuba. This might help explain the ragged performance of the Soviet leadership over the long weekend of 26-28 October, particularly Khrushchev's curious but still publicly undisclosed "emotional" letter at the height of the crisis, and the backdown decision which followed.

What congruent set of US actions and statements might have led to a collapse of confidence by Khrushchev? This calls for careful study of all the "signals"--deliberate or otherwise--which we may have been giving off at the time, but a few may be mentioned here: the military movements and intense activity in the SE United States, which may have looked very much like an invasion precursor; SAC's readiness posture, which included a larger-scale and more rapid dispersal of the force than had ever occurred before; the "abyss of destruction" tone of some high-level US statements during the crisis; US private communications to its Allies which conveyed a sense of US seriousness that the Soviets would rate all the higher had they acquired knowledge of the contents by intelligence means, which was probably the case. Further, the accidental but uncannily well-timed intrusion of a U-2 into Soviet arctic airspace may have struck the Soviets as a classic indicator of preparation for a US strategic attack, touching on a chord of Soviet concern that "preventive war"--so often harped upon in Soviet propaganda and military literature--might now be on the way.

These same factors, differently perceived and evaluated in Moscow, might also of course have been taken to foreshadow an invasion of Cuba, rather than an attack on the Soviet Union. Indeed, apart from the hints of a great disarray

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among the Soviet leadership which one might tend to associate with anxiety over the risk of nuclear war, most elements of the situation might suggest that invasion--and the consequences of coping with it--lay at the center of Soviet concern.

It must have been fairly apparent to Moscow, for example, that the US did not have to resort to nuclear weapons either to enforce the quarantine, to knock out the missile sites, or to invade Cuba--and that therefore the main danger of escalation into nuclear war would come from Soviet response to a US non-nuclear initiative. It was therefore the prospect of a clash of conventional forces--in which geography and other factors would have spelled certain loss for the Soviet-Cuban side--which in the first instance may have dismayed the Soviet leadership. Their concern would have been compounded, of course, by knowing that once invasion were underway, they would have to face the hard and perhaps impossible choice of either knuckling under and accepting the loss of both their missiles and probably the Castro regime, or incurring irresponsible nuclear risks of their own making. The psychological strain of being put in this position could well account for the anomalies in Soviet leadership behavior which have been noted, although it should also be added that the pattern of behavior which eventually governed was highly rational--Khrushchev offered in haste to withdraw his offending missiles without waiting to find out whether the US really meant to adopt a violent solution.

Soviet Crisis Lessons

Indeed, Khrushchev showed a very high capacity for "crisis learning". Although he had perhaps held the US nuclear writ in contempt when establishing a military foothold in Cuba in the first instance, and had taken an even bolder

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step later by introducing a nuclear/missile capability, he quickly applied self-imposed restrictions on Soviet conduct when strong US reaction was encountered.

In this connection, the military lessons which Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders may have drawn from the Cuban experience are worth careful study. Did they at one extreme, for example, suffer the traumatic experience of peering into the abyss of nuclear war, and from this may they have drawn the conclusion--already an article of Soviet doctrine and propaganda--that limited conflicts between nuclear powers are uncontrollable and must inevitably escalate into general nuclear war? Or may they have drawn precisely the opposite conclusion--that limited conflicts, such as Cuba was, even though shooting had not started--are manageable and controllable?

Were the first lesson drawn, conceivably the Soviets might eschew any sort of military confrontation in the future, and seek instead "radical" political solutions. If the second conclusion applies, the Soviets might well feel that limited conflicts can be entertained, providing the conditions are more favorable to the Soviet side than in Cuba. In this light, Cuba's main military lesson for the Soviets might have been: avoid getting into conflict situations where both local and strategic superiority rests preponderantly on the other side. The Cuban experience, of course, would not have illuminated the kind of situation in which one side holds local and the other strategic superiority.

Bold New Strategy or Improvisation

Another task of analysis might be addressed to the question whether the Soviet decision to deploy offensive weapons to Cuba was part of a larger

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decision to project Soviet military force into the Caribbean area under a thoughtfully-planned "forward strategy", or whether it was merely tacked on to the military program for Cuba at some later point--perhaps after US reaction to introduction of modern "defensive" weapons had been tested and deemed not unduly alarming.

The lead time for preparation and shipment of the strategic missile force, its size, the timing of the move--these factors would tend to suggest that the deployment decision was made within the framework of broad strategic planning, rather than on the spur of the moment. On the other hand, the hasty character of the actual operational deployment to field sites, after concealed advance preparation (of duration unknown to us), might suggest that there was a large measure of improvisation involved.

Careful analysis of the whole operation might pin down this question more precisely, and furnish complementary insights into other questions which the Cuban venture raises. For example, there has been little suggestion in Soviet military writing or elite statements of a theoretical foundation for a Soviet "forward strategy", which would represent a new form of challenge to the global strategic dominance of the United States. (Indeed, so far as elite statements go, a contrary concept has been asserted--in the TASS 11 September statement and subsequent elaborations on the point that the Soviet Union has no need to deploy missiles to Cuba or anywhere else outside its own territory, because homeland-based ICBM's can reach the necessary targets anywhere.) If, despite the doctrinal lacuna, the Soviet Cuban venture was carefully conceived to upset the relation of nuclear forces and to stake out a Soviet politico-military power position on the Caribbean flank of the United States, the implications

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would be far-reaching indeed. One might then view Cuba as a major historical turning point, where Soviet policy was to make the switch from plodding, cautious expansionist activity to a forward, out-flanking stroke against the strategic power center of the Atlantic Alliance itself. Cool and daring calculation would be the hallmark of such a strategic conception, and one might well question whether the standard assumptions as to the careful orthodoxy of Soviet strategic thinking are any longer valid.

On the other hand, if the missile venture had in fact been rather hectically improvised and hastily implemented, quite different inferences might be drawn. It might look then more like an act of desperation, a gamble for high stakes in the face of repeated frustration--perhaps the politico-military equivalent of Khrushchev's Virgin Lands solution to his persistent agricultural problem. Rather than a new forward turning point in Soviet policy, one might interpret the Soviet Cuban move as a belated effort to salvage a deteriorating international position.

Soviet Leadership Factions

Another area of analysis in which the available evidence probably does not go very far is that of attempting to distinguish various factions and positions within the Soviet leadership which may have had significant bearing on the way the Cuban venture was conceived and handled, and on how its aftermath may be dealt with.

The relationship between Khrushchev and the Soviet military leadership is pertinent in this connection, as well as that between putative--but unproven--"hard" and "soft" factions in the Soviet bureaucracy. Several hypothesis can be advanced.

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As to Khrushchev and the Soviet military, it can be argued that the missile deployment was Khrushchev's brain child, conceived as a political gamble upon which the military looked without enthusiasm. When the game went sour, it was the Soviet military leaders, under this hypothesis, who brought pressure on Khrushchev to withdraw because they smelled the risk of general war which the Soviet Union was not in shape to fight, and because they feared the loss of modern Soviet weapons and highly trained personnel, etc. If this interpretation is sound, one could presume that the military elite, who have frequently found fault with Khrushchev's defense policies over the last three years, would now press with new vigor for allocation of greater resources to the military establishment. They might also tend to ally themselves with any opposition elements among the political leadership who might now be prone to criticize Khrushchev's "adventurism".

A variant of the above hypothesis, which may have some support in the apparent three-sided character of the internal Soviet dialogue on military strategy of the past few years, would link Khrushchev with a kind of "young Turk" faction of "progressives" among the military, ranged against a conservative military majority. In this case, Khrushchev's instincts as a political gambler may have been combined with strategic inspiration from a "progressive" military faction, leading to the belief that a bold solution of the strategic imbalance was possible.

On the other hand, it can also be argued that quite different positions were taken by Khrushchev and the military respectively. The latter may have been the staunchest advocates of the initial deployment of missiles, on the

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theory that only thus could the Soviet Union hope to gain significant ground in the numbers race in strategic forces, and improve its pre-emptive capability, about which they had been professionally concerned since Malinovsky's "theses" in October 1961 drew attention to the critical nature of the initial period of a war which the "imperialists" might initiate with an attempted nuclear surprise attack. Under this hypothesis, it may have been Khrushchev who went along with the missile scheme with reservations, and who at the first sign of mis-carriage sought to back out without even attaching conditions to his retreat. The subsequent demand for a Turkey-Cuba missile swap may, in this view, have emanated from pressures on Khrushchev by a hard faction, which subsequently found itself sidetracked when the crisis seemed about to split wide open.

Further speculation on internal alignments does not seem warranted here, although patient combing of the evidence might yield some useful insight into this aspect of the Cuban affair, and consequently, help to indicate what weight the voice of the military may carry in the post-Cuban reassessment of the Soviet military posture.

The range of possible interpretations illustratively suggested above indicates that some of the factors bearing on the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba are by no means self-evident, and that there is need for an analytical effort that would tie the various strands of Soviet motivation and behavior in the crisis more closely together.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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November 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NITZE

SUBJECT: The Question of Cuban Objectives

At the time of the initiation of the Cuban blockade, President Kennedy properly stated that US objectives were "long-term assurances".

The US does in fact have a number of objectives in Cuba which may or may not be achieved as a result of present actions. They are:

1. Removal of missiles.
2. Removal of IL-28s.
3. Removal of organized Soviet military forces.
4. Removal of Soviet defensive weapons such as SAMs and MIG 21s.
5. Removal of Castro.

In addition to these objectives, we have an additional objective to provide suitable verification safeguards that any agreements will be fulfilled. The type of verification required clearly depends upon our success in achieving other objectives. For example, if the Soviet Union succeeds in maintaining large conventional military units in Cuba, nothing less than on-site ground inspection would provide adequate verification. If the Soviet Union removed all of their military forces from Cuba, then occasional air surveillance probably would be adequate. If on the other hand we were successful in obtaining Castro's removal, occasional pro forma air surveillance as a part of OAS inspection would be more than adequate.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue that we should attempt to achieve all of these objectives as a result of the present crisis but rather that we cannot make sound short-term decisions without an agreement as to our long-term objectives. Further that our immediate decisions should be consistent with our long-term objectives.

While we concur in current efforts to obtain the IL-28 removal, and ground inspection, through negotiations at the UN, we are concerned as well that the problem of "suitable safeguards" is not forgotten. In our view there is a very real danger that in the euphoria of success following the Russian removal of missiles and possibly bombers, we may yet snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

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Estimate of Soviet Objectives.

1. In our view the Soviet Union intends to have the existence of Soviet conventional bases in Cuba accepted by the U.S. and other nations of the OAS.

2. Seek to obtain guarantees by the United States and "other nations of the Hemisphere" against invasion even at the price of surrendering the IL-28's. In the Soviet and Cuban view, air surveillance would be considered an "invasion" of Cuban air space.

3. Admit a superficial inspection by certain foreign nationals, not the OAS, that the missiles and aircraft have been removed. Then reject any further attempts to establish inspection as a long-term safeguard.

4. Attempt to "normalize" relations between Latin American states and Cuba. The communist line would be:

a. Cuba has voluntarily given up nuclear weapons and "complied" with the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreements and therefore should be accepted back into the bosom of the Latin American community. This will be a very difficult argument to rebut if the Russians nominally comply with the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement and receive assurances from the U.S. This line might well be accepted by nations such as [REDACTED]

b. If the Soviet Union is permitted to proceed down this track the U.S. would find itself in an increasingly difficult position because it would be clearly opposed to the continuance of Soviet forces in Cuba and concurrent acceptance of Cuba within the OAS but it would be hard to find an issue upon which to base U.S. initiatives. Needless to say internal right wing pressures would press for invasion despite our guarantee.

5. The Soviet Union could be expected over a period of months to increase their conventional forces in Cuba possibly introducing modern tank brigades for example which would be paraded regularly through Havana with much publicity.

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US Objectives


In our view the Soviet Union may yet obtain a net advantage from the Cuban crisis if they are able to establish defacto American acceptance of Cuba as a Soviet military base. The precedence established in achieving the IL-28's removal will in large part determine our position on subsequent issues; therefore, we consider it absolutely essential that the United States maintain pressure including quarantine and aerial surveillance of Cuba, until "suitable safeguards" are negotiated with Cuba. While a reduction in tensions at this time would be popular, it is clearly in the United States interests to continue the present tensions and crisis until our minimum objectives are achieved. At the very least, the US should press toward adequate inspection within the framework of the Brazilian Resolution. Such a goal will prove impossible if the United States concurs in an agreement to "end" the Cuban crisis.

Furthermore, the US must recognize as its objective the removal of all organized Soviet military forces from Cuba. While this cannot and will not be achieved in a day or a week, it is essential that we maintain pressure on Castro until long-term assurances are obtained or a significant change in the Cuban regime is achieved. While the enforcement of the blockade may be suspended and some reconnaissance flights may be suspended, the US should make clear that the quarantine and the air surveillance program are not suspended.

In our view neither the air surveillance nor the quarantine should be removed until long-term assurances and safeguards are obtained. The experience of the Cuban missile build-up clearly shows that variable statements by various Soviet-Cuban leaders cannot be accepted as adequate assurances.

While US should be willing to suspend enforcement of the blockade if the Soviet Union will remove IL-28's, the US should make clear its view that the quarantine will not be fully removed until in the President's words, "suitable safeguards to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments" are established.

As soon as possible the US must develop a position defining the type of long-term safeguards which it requires. Two tentative courses which are not mutually exclusive should be considered.

1. Expand the present Brazilian Resolution for a Latin American Free Zone
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[REDACTED]
(See Tab A).

Also it would undoubtedly lead to pressures limiting US bases in Latin America. However, our current support in the OAS should make the latter pressures a negligible problem.

2. A second course, which may be carried out concurrently or separately, is to support the Brazilian Resolution on condition that Cuba is included and then rapidly implement appropriate inspection. An ad hoc meeting, including the OAS and Cuba, to establish inspection requirements should be called as rapidly as possible following the passage of the Resolution. The US should prepare a position carefully worked out in which not only Cuba but adjacent areas would be inspected. If Cuba accepted this, the US should indicate that the OAS should consider Cuba's readmission under certain specified conditions on a probationary basis. It is by no means clear that such a step would result in the departure of Soviet forces but at the very least close inspection of Soviet forces would significantly limit their political significance not only in the United States but throughout Latin America.

Such action would create a major dilemma for Castro and/or Khrushchev-on the one hand they would be forced to permit recommended inspections parties to check any and all military forces in Cuba or they would have to reject a program for peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis which had broad OAS support. In either case, US interest would be advanced for we would either be thoroughly informed on events in Cuba or the Cuban rejection of a Brazilian initiative would make it difficult if not impossible for Castro to normalize relations with the OAS. This in turn would permit broad increased support for political sanctions against Cuba and obviously maintain the solidarity of the OAS which has been a vital element in the Cuban crisis to date.

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*See last 2 paragraphs
primary in text
slightly revised*

Assurances

(Reference U. Alexis Johnson's Memorandum)

In view of the above, we do not concur in the US Declaration in the Security Council as presently drafted. Where the present assurances says:

"The U.S. appreciates the measures taken and the arrangements made, and expresses its satisfaction that it has been possible to provide these assurances to the peoples of the Western Hemisphere that the threat of offensive weapons against them has been removed and will not recur."

This statement should be revised to read as follows: "Expresses its satisfaction that the threat of offensive weapons against the peoples of the Western Hemisphere has been removed at this time."

We recommend striking the following sentence:

"At the conclusion of this meeting of the Security Council, the United States will notify the Secretary General of the Organization of American States that the arrangements in question have been completed and, accordingly, the effectiveness of the resolution of October 28 should be considered as terminated."

The following sentence should be revised as follows:

"In these circumstances, the United States will suspend enforcement of the quarantine of shipping going to Cuba subject to the negotiation of suitable safeguards to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. The US calls upon Cuba and the Organization of American States to meet quickly to formulate such safeguards in keeping with the Brazilian Resolution of November ."

"Upon the successful completion of such negotiations the US will lift its defensive quarantine of shipping and will terminate the proclamation of October 23 by which the quarantine was established in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the organ of consultation. The United States at that time will also give assurances against invasion of Cuba, in the light of the arrangements that have been made and on the understanding and continuation that no offensive weapons are stationed in Cuba."

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Recommendations

1. The US immediately take steps to prepare a position on inspection organization including operational plans and inspection procedures, for an OAS inspection organization to fulfill the obligations under the Brazilian Resolution.

2. Give serious consideration to the possibility of including a statement in the Brazilian Resolution [REDACTED]

A variation of this basic idea would be to have the OAS pass the Resolution calling upon member states to take steps to [REDACTED]

3. Modify the US statement in the Security Council as indicated above.

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MASTER OF
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REQUESTER

1. Possible Soviet Intentions

a. Broad-long term

Pressure on us to accept their version of coexistence

Removal of occupation forces from Berlin

Removal of foreign bases

Their version of disarmament

b. Political - intermediate term

Pressure on us to act so as to put ourselves in untenable political situation vis-a-vis rest of NATO, OAS, UN, etc. Face us with choice either of initiating military action,

or of appearing weak, purposeless and unreliable ally.

c. Tactical

1. Keep momentum of leadership of foreign communist movements versus Chi-coms.

2. For domestic purposes keep up momentum of initiative.

3. Support Latin American Commie movement by demonstrating possibility of facing up to U.S.

4. Provide a bargaining point in negotiations with U.S.-Turkey, etc.

5. Contingent objectives, depending on how situation evolves.

1. Involve us in war, _____ with an underdog country.

2. Provide favorable climate for increased pressure on Berlin.

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3. Improved strategic position for Soviet Union if we do nothing; redoubtless time; improved submarine basing.

4. Exploit political differences within U.S.

5. Bring about Summit meeting on terms favorable to accomplishment of his broad objectives.

II. Criteria for U.S. response

a.

b. The U.S. political objective is to preserve the strength of our alliances, defend our posture in the world's eyes, and maintain political unity domestically in the face of the problem faced us by this move.

c. Factors which will influence the maintenance of the alliance are the degree to which we can:

1. Make a convincing case for the actions we take.

2. Consult with and prepare our allies before we act.

3. Give Castro or the Soviets a way out before we act.

4. Concurrently with acting offer a way out through a summit meeting or otherwise.

Lack of effective action may, however, be as damaging to our alliances as action made ineffective by excessive attention to consultation and diplomatic refinements.

The objective of domestic unity will argue in favor of more rigorous action than perhaps called for by international considerations alone.

Proposed Alternatives for a U.S. Action Program

Primary Emphasis on Political Action

The objective of this program would be to obtain unified support of NATO and the OAS for U.S. policy. The key note would be maturity and wisdom of our course. The President would make a public announcement of the facts, call for consultation in OAS and NATO, play down the addition which these Soviet capabilities in Cuba make to over-all Soviet capabilities, and emphasize the sell-out of Castroism to Soviet puppet-hood.

The only immediate military type action taken by U.S. under this alternative would be intensified surveillance, and appropriate redeployment of certain U.S. forces.

Variations which could be added to this alternative would be:

1. Announcement that any indication of preparation for use of offensive capabilities against the Caribbean area or U.S. would be followed by immediate destruction of those systems.
2. Strong efforts to get NATO and OAS to support the elimination of offensive systems on Cuba, if not removed within a time limit, and or support for naval denial of Soviet military shipments to Cuba.

Other actions designed to cause a split in the Castro

4. Negotiations with Castro to get him to eliminate Soviet weapons

Alternative Action Accompanied by Limited Military Action.

The objective of this alternative program would be to assure the elimination of Soviet offensive weapons systems in Cuba with the employment of the minimum necessary and sufficient military means.

The action would start with the appropriate Defense Department option 1, 2, 3, or 4, followed immediately by a Presidential announcement describing the facts, their inconsistency with Khrushchev's assurances, an analysis emphasizing the military threat to the Caribbean and to the U.S., a statement of the action taken, and those to be taken, a call for a meeting of the OAS and of NATO to be followed by a summit meeting with Khrushchev.

Variations on this alternative would include:

1. Simultaneous or subsequent naval denial of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba.
2. Full blockade of Cuba.
3. Announcement that any retaliation subsequent to our action would result in a U.S. declaration of war against Cuba.

This alternative, with or without its variations, faces the stark prospect of some form of Soviet/Cuban response, the nature of which is inherently not predictable in advance.

A number of areas for contingency plans or preparation to meet the more obvious of the possible repostes are evident:

a. With respect to Cuba

- I. An attack on Guantanamo.
- II. Air or missile attack on the U.S.
- III. Air attack against reconnaissance planes

b. World-wide

- I. Demands on Turkey, Taiwan, Pakistan, Korea, Iran, etc.
- II. Actual attack upon U.S. installations in those countries.
- III. Signing of Peace Treaty and demand for withdrawal U.S. troops from Berlin.
- IV. Overthrow of weak governments in Latin America.

c. Political Action backed by Full Military Action

The objective of this alternative would be definitely to remove Castro from the Cuban scene and secure the island for a regime responsive to the Cuban people and prepared to cooperate with the existing system in this Hemisphere.

The initial action would be option 4 or 5 of the Defense Department options followed by a Presidential announcement giving a history of Soviet capture of the Castro regime, distinguishing between the aggressive nature of Communist policy and the defensive nature of U.S. bases overseas and their purposes. Distinguishing U.S. bases overseas and their purposes from offensive installations in this Hemisphere, describing the actions already under way, and indicating further action.

At the appropriate time actions under option 5(a) and 5(b) would follow.

~~Perhaps~~ explanation of our action in OAS, NATO, and the U.N.
~~would be required.~~

The prospect would be that one or more of the contingencies
outlined under alternative (b) above would become actual.

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J-3
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0300

MILITARY MEASURES TO SUPPORT US OBJECTIVES IN CUBA

~~The purpose of this paper is to present in chronological~~

sequence the significant military actions taken and to be taken in establishment of a limited naval blockade of Cuba and other military measures to provide for the defense of vital US interests. The contingencies provided for are limited blockade; selective air strikes, land, sea, and air defense; invasion; and preparation for general war.

2. The military concept is based on establishment of a blockade employing primarily US naval forces, of those ships carrying military cargo (offensive weapons). Forces of CAS and Rio Treaty members could assist if available. Concurrently with the blockade, US military forces world-wide progressively will be brought to increased defense readiness condition from which prompt and appropriate action can be taken to respond to any aggressive action on the part of Cuba or members of the Communist Bloc.

3. Much has been done to place our forces in an increased readiness posture (see Enclosure A). Overt actions have been related to improvement of our defense posture in Southeast United States and to reinforcement of our defense of the Guantanamo base in Cuba. Covertly, we have accomplished preliminary readying of all forces to meet the contingencies which may arise.

4. P-Hour is defined as the hour the President makes a public statement of United States positions and intentions as a result of developments in Cuba. P-Day is defined as the day upon which the announcement is made. It is expected that the President will issue a proclamation on blockade, with a 24-hour grace period, on P+1. The blockade will be imposed at the expiration of the grace period. This day is known as E-Day.

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
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22 October 1962

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5. The available plans to cope with the range of Cuban
military responses to the announcement and imposition of
blockade are



see

Enclosure B.

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P-DAY - 1

ACTIONS TAKE

JCS 6827,
~~211639Z~~

[REDACTED]

2. Direct C/S, USA, to alert Third Army Headquarters of possible requirement for execution of Joint Defense Plans for Southeastern United States and for Florida Keys. No action to be taken prior to P-Hour.

3. Direct CINCLANT prepare for protection of US shipping in Florida Straits, Windward Passage and Yucantan Channel.

4. CINCLANT to suspend PHIBRIGLEX-62. Newsmen to move south as planned.

5. Direct COFS USAF to be prepared discreetly to arrange with FAA for corridor reservations into Florida staging areas as required by CINCLANT/CINCONAD. In addition, inform FAA of military Emergency Zone (MEZ) to be established at P-Hour.

JCS 6822,
210819Z

6. Continue high-altitude photographic reconnaissance.

JCS 6827,
211639Z

8.

JCS 6827,
211639Z

9. JCS issue to CINCLANT planning directive for Blockade of Cuba containing:

JCS 6827,
211639Z

- a. Rules of engagement
- b. Instructions for blockade of surface ships
- c. Instructions for blockade of aircraft
- d. A concept of operations
- e. Defense of Guantanamo
- f. Control and protection of American shipping
- g. Coordination with Allied or friendly forces

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10

11. CINCSTANT assumes opscom of Army and Air Force
forces assigned to OPLANS 312/314/316 from CINCSTRIKE.

12. AFLANT strike aircraft commence move into
southern bases in increments.

13. JCS instruct CINCARIB to be prepared to furnish
Riot Control Support to Panama and other Latin American
countries as required.

JCS 6843
220228Z

P-DAY

1. Direct SAC initiate force generation.
2. Activate Joint Battle Staff.
3. Inform CINCs and Services imminence impending operations.
4. Authorize phased dispersal CONAD nuclear armed interceptors at P-Hour - 12

5. [REDACTED]

211639Z)

6. Continue high-altitude photographic reconnaissance.
7. SAC alert aircraft depart Homestead AFB.
8. Authorize US Army to move Automatic Weapons Instructional Unit from Fort Bliss to Florida Bases. Unit will provide nucleus of units to enhance air defense posture in the southeastern United States. No movement prior to P-Hour.

9. [REDACTED]

10. Authorize CINCSAC to implement 1/8 airborne alert and execute force dispersal plan.

11. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED] commence movement when loaded, and chop operational control to CINCLANT.

13. As requested by CINCONAD, direct temporary assignment

[REDACTED]

14. Provide authority for Services to move support units and fillers.


15. Direct Chief of Staff, Army, move available AAA units to Florida for use as required.

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8-3
22 October 196
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P HOUR

- ✓ 1. DEFCON 3 established for US forces world-wide.
2. Commence assembly of forces for execution of OPLANS 314/316.
- ✓ 3. Direct MINIMIZE world-wide.
- ✓ 4. Direct implementation of Military Emergency Zone (MEZ) and security Control of Air Traffic (SCAT) procedures in southern Florida (App 5, Annex B, CONAD OPLN 1-62).



5. CINCLANT obtain approval Dade County officials to use Opalacka Airfield, Florida. Move units in on P+1 Day.
6. [Redacted]

9. Authority for Services to move support units and individual fillers.

- ✓ 10. Tell CSA to move available AA units (about 15) to Florida air bases as requested by CINCONAD.

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P-DAY + 1

1. President issue Blockade Proclamation.
2. Direct appropriate DEFCON changes world-wide.
3. SAC attains maximum readiness.
4. Warn all shipping to remain clear of Cuban waters and all aircraft to remain clear of Cuba.
5. Request Presidential authority to implement CRAF plan.
6. Alternate authority relocate to Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC).
7. Continue high-altitude photographic reconnaissance.
8. Continue assembly of forces.
9. Continue to improve air defense posture in southeastern United States and friendly territories in the Caribbean to include airborne patrols.

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3 DAY + 2 (3 Day)

1. At end of grace period limited sea blockade of Cuba is imposed by CINCLANT blockade plan.
2. Continue surveillance of the operational area.
3. Protect US shipping in Florida Straits, Windward Passage and Yucatan Channel.

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B - X Days


1 If Cuban aircraft or naval vessels attack US blockade forces CINCLANT will enforce JCS established blockade rules of engagement.

2. If Soviet or any other nation's vessels or aircraft refuse to acquiesce in blockade, CINCLANT will employ such force as necessary for the self-defense of the blockade forces and to maintain the effectiveness of the blockade.


3. In the event of Cuban raids against United States and friendly territories within the realm of the attacker's capabilities, US commanders will use all available resources to capture, repel or destroy the raiders.

4 In the event of Cuban military action against the US military base at Guantanamo or against US war ships, aircraft, shipping, or the United States, retaliatory action may be taken to include the execution of appropriate CINCLANT CPLANS 312 and 314/316.

5. If a substantial popular uprising against Castro occurs wherein the leaders request US aid



6. In the event of Cuban armed assistance to subversion and uprisings in other parts of the Western Hemisphere



ENCLOSURE A

ACTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRIOR TO P DAY -1 INCLUDE:

1. JCS has directed CINCARIB to transfer operational control of two LST to CINCLANT.
2. JCS has directed CINCPAC to transfer operational control of [REDACTED]
3. Command relations have been reviewed and modified (CINCLANT has assumed responsibilities previously assigned to CJTF-122 (COMSECONDEFLT)).
4. Department of Army has been directed to expedite readiness of A HAWK Battalion at Fort Meade, Maryland CINCONAD is authorized to move unit to Key West at his discretion.
5. CINCONAD has been authorized to:
 - a. Deploy 14 F-102 aircraft from Seymour Johnston AFB to Homestead AFB (brings total to 18). Aircraft reported now in place.
 - b. Deploy 6 F-105 aircraft from Langley AFB to Patrick AFB (brings total to 12). Aircraft reported now in place.
 - c. Deploy six RC-121 AEW&C aircraft to McCoy AFB (brings total to 12). Aircraft reported now in place.
 - d. Alert CINCONAD aircraft in place at Tyndall AFB for use as augmentation forces.
 - e. Retain detachment of naval all-weather fighters (VFAW-3) at Key West NAS (10 F4D).
6. Increased reconnaissance has been conducted.
7. Targeting of specific targets in Cuba has been initiated with majority of target folders completed and pilots briefed.*
8. Training has been conducted on mock-up SAM site.
9. Profile flight training conducted by pilots and crews against Florida coast in rehearsal for strikes against Cuba.
10. [REDACTED]

* This has not been completed for latest sensitive intelligence. Now in progress.

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11 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Movement has been started, expected to close GTMO midnight, 21 October.

12. Non-alert SAC aircraft at SAC bases (MacDill, McCoy and Homestead AFB) alerted to move over three day period.

13. Commander MSTTS alerted as to possible need of ships under his control.

14 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] LANT will arrange MATS movement. Unit is alerted for movement.

15. Message alerting CARIB and LANT, info SAC and CONAD, against possible air attack Panama Canal, Ramey AFB, Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and requesting recommendations for augmentation of air defenses.

16. Have identified by Service, order of magnitude of forces to be mobilized under the 150,000 ceiling.

17. CINCPAC directed to assemble shipping [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] - no loading till further notice.

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Unit now in place.

21. 4 TACAN equipped destroyers on station between Cuba and southern tip of Florida.

22 [REDACTED]


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
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A. Purpose

items hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense.

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B. General Rules

1. General guidance contained in Section Part 6, paragraph 1, JCS 98595I is superseded by this instruction; para 2 will apply except as modified below.

2. Guidance for conduct of engagement between US forces and ships and aircraft of other registry or ownership is covered below.

C. Visit, Search, Seizure and Diversion

1. Ships, including submarines, both Soviet and non-Soviet, designated by CINCLANT on basis of information available to him will be intercepted by US ships. If CINCLANT or the Commander of the intercepting ship believes the ship may be carrying prohibited material, a visit and search will be made, in a manner similar to that described in paragraph 502b of NWIP 10-2.

2. Ships which after being intercepted signal their intention to divert to non-Cuban ports may be released without visit and search. Surveillance will be maintained over these ships. Any ship which fails to proceed as elected, or which attempts to proceed to a Cuban port, will be stopped and boarded. If a satisfactory explanation for his failure to proceed as elected is not promptly forthcoming, the ship will be seized and diverted to a US port designated by the Blockade Force Commander or other authority as designated by CINCLANT for disposition.

3. Ships which are to be visited will be stopped. In signifying his intent to stop a ship, the US Commander will use all available communications, including international code signals, flag hoists, blinking lights, radio, loudspeaker, etc. Failing this, warning shots across the bow should be fired. Failing this, make use of minimum force, taking care to damage non-vital parts of the ship, such as the rudder, and to avoid injury or loss of life if possible.

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4. Visit and search of a stopped ship shall consist of examining the manifest and inspecting the cargo. In the event visit is refused, the ship may be seized. This shall be done by placing a boarding party on board. Research, boarding and control of the ship's operation may be necessary. If boarding meets with organized resistance, the ship will be destroyed.

5. If it becomes necessary to destroy a ship, give ample warning of intentions to permit sufficient time for debarkation of the passengers and crew. Assistance shall be given to the maximum extent permitted by the operational conditions.

6. Ships which have been searched and found to be carrying prohibited material shall be directed to proceed to such non-Cuban port as the owners or master may elect. Surveillance shall be maintained over these ships. Any ship which fails to proceed as elected, or which attempts to proceed to a Cuban port, will be handled as detailed in paragraph 2 above.

7. If a ship is visited but search is refused, the commander of the ship or force conducting the visit will seize the ship if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting the ship to be carrying prohibited materials. It will be diverted to a designated US port for disposition.

8. Nothing in the above shall be construed as preventing or interfering with the right of visit and search by any US ship. Specifically:

a. Any ships, including surface warships, armed merchant ships or submarines, which interfere or threaten to interfere with a US ship engaged in visit and search will be treated as hostile and may be engaged to the extent required to terminate the interference.

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b. Any ships, including surface warships, armed merchant ships, or submarines, which place themselves in a position or take actions which can reasonably be considered as threatening a US ship engaged in visit and search may be subjected to attack to the extent required to terminate the threat.

D. Blockade of aircraft

1. Plans should be made, to apply when ordered by higher headquarters, to prevent aircraft enroute to Cuba which are believed to carry prohibited material from reaching their destination. Responsibility for action against such aircraft, when ordered by higher headquarters, will pass to CINCLANT when they enter his area of responsibility.

2. In taking action against such aircraft, every effort will be made to avoid interference with or inconvenience to innocent traffic.

3. In preventing an aircraft carrying prohibited material from entering Cuba, the following steps shall be taken:

First, attempts by every possible means shall be made to direct the pilot to land the aircraft at a suitable airfield under US control.

Failing this, aircraft shall be dispatched to intercept. Upon interception, and after positive identification, they shall maneuver to direct the pilot of the suspected aircraft to follow to the airfield. In making the intercept and in maneuvering care shall be taken to avoid danger of an accidental collision.

If the suspected aircraft fails to follow the intercepting aircraft, shots or a rocket or flare may be fired, in such a manner that the aircraft is not endangered but that the pilot cannot fail to see it. If time is available this action should be repeated.

Failing this, the base or force commander of the operation shall be contacted by the interceptor pilot for instructions. The interceptor pilot shall take hostile action against

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the suspected aircraft only upon receipt of positive authenticated instructions from his commander or from higher authority.

II. Concept of Operations

A. General It is contemplated that maximum use will be made of all available assets for collecting, reporting and interpreting intelligence relative to merchant shipping and aircraft engaged in trade with Cuba to identify those which might be carrying prohibited material. Intelligence indicates that the majority of prohibited material is carried in Communist bloc ships.

B. Conduct of Blockade Patrols and Air Surveillance

Until further directed planning for these operations will be carried out on the basis that normal position of intercept will take place outside the effective range of aircraft known to be operational from their established bases.

C. Diversion Ports

US ports designated to receive ships diverted as described in para 1.0.2 above will be chosen with due regard to the desirability of remaining outside the effective range of aircraft known to be operational in Cuba with the availability of US air protection.

III. Defense of Guantanamo

A. General

Establishment of the blockade described above may lead to attack or threat of attack by Cuban forces on the Naval Base Guantanamo or against ships or aircraft approaching or leaving Guantanamo.

Suitable force dispositions, including the stationing of naval forces and troop reinforcements, will be taken as appropriate upon receipt of this message. Any attack against the Guantanamo Naval Base or against ships or aircraft approaching or leaving will be repulsed by offensive action against the attacking aircraft or ship or ground-installation. Only in the event that it is absolutely necessary in order to protect American lives will U.S. forces be authorized to attack the bases from which the aircraft or ships are operating.

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B. Special Rules of Engagement

In addition to the rules of engagement previously referenced, permission is granted coincident with establishment of the above described blockade to immediately engage and destroy any KODAK Class PCMG which makes a hostile approach on US Naval forces or US merchant shipping.

IV. Control and Protection of American Flag Merchant Shipping

A. Coincident with establishment of the blockade, institute protection for U.S. shipping in Florida Straits, Yucatan Channel, and Windward Passage. Use all cover and surface forces as necessary. It is not desired to institute control of shipping measures although advisories as to preferred routings such as passage close to the Florida Keys and Mexican coast and use of Mona vice Windward Passage may be desirable in the interest of economic use of forces.

V. Availability of Allied or Friendly Forces.

Prior to or immediately following the Presidential Proclamation of a blockade of Cuba, efforts will be made to enlist the aid of allied or friendly nations in enforcing the blockade. CINCLANT should cooperate fully with such nations and take every advantage of their contributions to increase the efficiency of the blockade and to reduce the commitment of US forces.

VI. Hot Pursuit

VII. Reports

Prompt reports to higher headquarters on all incidents are absolutely essential.

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CNO-2, CSAF-2, CMC-8, CSA-4

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e. Military installations in the Caribbean area alerted against possible air attack.

f. Warning orders issued in form of "exclusive for" messages to CINCs and in case of blockade, dissemination of prepared messages to MAAGs and Missions in Latin America will be made.

g. CINCLANT has been directed to prepare for limited sea blockade of Cuba.

B-3 to B+X Days *implemented*
(B Day is day blockade is *ordered*)

1. JCS furnish CINCLANT Blockade rules of engagement.

2. B-3. Inform CINCs and Services increased state of tension could lead to military action. Execute covert preparatory actions for CINCLANT OPlans 312/314/316 and direct DEFCON 3 on a covert basis.

3. B-3. CINCLANT prepare for protection of US shipping with particular emphasis on Florida Straits and Windward Passage and Yucatan Channel.

4. B-3. JCS review and approval of CINCLANT Plan for limited blockade.

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5. B-3. Instruct CINCARIB to prepare for furnishing Riot Control Support to Panama and other Latin American countries ~~TOP SECRET~~ as required.

6. B-2. Direct DEFCON 2 world-wide.

7.

Complete reinforcement of GTMO.

8. Consider establishment of DEFCON 1, world-wide, to be effective at S-hour, as directed in separate scenario.

9. B-1

a. SAC attains 1/8th airborne alert plan and implements dispersal plan for certain SAC forces as required.

b. Authorize dispersal of CONAD nuclear armed interceptors.

c. JCS Alternate Authority relocate to the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC).

d. Warn all shipping to remain clear of Cuban waters and all aircraft to remain clear of Cuba.

e. Attain maximum air defense posture in Southeastern United States and friendly territories in the Caribbean to include continuous airborne patrols.

10. B-Day. Limited sea blockade of Cuba is imposed by CINCLANT blockade plan.

a. Authorize implementation of Military Emergency Zone (MEZ) and Security Control of Air Traffic (SCAT) procedures in Southern Florida.

b. Direct the Services to complete necessary actions with a view to implementing CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 on order.

d. Increase surveillance of the operational area.

e. Protect U.S. shipping in Florida Straits, Windward Passage and Yucatan Channel.

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11. 3 plus X Days

Contingent upon:

- a. Cuban aircraft or naval vessels attacking US blockade forces, CINCLANT will enforce JCS established blockade rules of engagement.
- b. Soviet or any other nation's vessels or aircraft refusal to acquiesce in blockade, CINCLANT will employ such force as necessary for the self-defense of the blockade forces and to maintain the effectiveness of the blockade.
- c. Cuban raids against United States and friendly territories within the realm of the attacker's capabilities, US commanders will use all available resources to capture, repel or destroy the raiders.
- d. Cuban military action against the US military base at Guantanamo or against US war ships or shipping direct necessary response probably to include the execution of appropriate CINCLANT Oplans 312 and 314/316.
- e. A substantial popular uprising against Castro wherein the leaders request US aid
- f. Cuban armed assistance to subversion and uprisings in other parts of the Western Hemisphere
- g. Soviet counteractions fully blockading Berlin, US forces will establish a full blockade against Cuba and upon approval of the President, JCS directs implementation of BERCON/MARCON plans in accordance with NSAM 109.

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RESEARCH

III

The military concept is based upon establishment of a blockade of all ships carrying military cargo (offensive weapons) employing primarily US naval forces. Forces of OAS and Rio Treaty members will be utilized as available. Concurrently, US military forces world-wide will be progressively brought to a based defense condition from which prompt offensive action could be taken to respond to any aggressive action on the part of Cuba or other members of the Warsaw Pact.

The course of action depicted herein is not recommended by Joint Chiefs of Staff but is presented in event this approach to inhibiting Cuban build-up is adopted.

4. Certain actions which are preparatory in nature and are applicable to any course of action have been taken. They facilitate readiness of CINCLANT and world-wide forces, whether the blockade achieves its purpose or causes the situation to escalate.

a. Unified commands and services have been ordered to transfer certain forces to CINCLANT and CONAD and have been alerted to the probable requirement for additional transfers

b. CONAD has been authorized deployments to strengthen air defense of southeastern United States and has been queried regarding adequacy of present forces.

c. Targeting is maintained in consonance with increased surveillance.

2. Transport for dependent evacuation held in vicinity:

1950.

